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"WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE": 
WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS 
AND THE REQUIREMENT 
OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT* 
Barbara J. Flagg** 
Advocating race consciousness is unthinkable for most white liber-
als. I We define our position on the continuum of racism by the degree 
of our commitment to colorblindness; the more certain we are that 
race is never relevant to any assessment of an individual's abilities or 
achievements, the more certain we are that we have overcome racism 
as we conceive of it. This way of thinking about race is a matter of 
principle as well as a product of historical experience. It reflects the 
traditional liberal view that the autonomous individual, whose exist-
ence is analytically prior to that of society,2 ought never be credited 
with, nor blamed for, personal characteristics not under her own con-
trol, such as gender or race, or group membership or social status that 
is a consequence of birth rather than individual choice or accomplish-
• The hymn "Amazing Grace," written by John Newton (1725-1807), first appeared as one 
of the Olney Hymns, a collection published by Newton and William Cowper in 1779. Newton 
had been captain ofa slave ship from 1750 to 1754, but a religious conversion gradually led him 
to repudiate his former occupation and eventually to write an antislavery pamphlet titled 
"Thoughts upon the African Slave Trade." Many believe that "Amazing Grace" expresses 
Newton's gratitude for having become able to comprehend the extent of the evil in which he had 
participated. 
•• Assistant Professor, Washington University, St. Louis. A.B. 1967, M.A. 1971, Califor-
nia-Riverside; J.D. 1987, California-Berkeley. - Ed. i" extend special thanks to Fran Ansley, 
Susan Appleton, Kate Bartlett, Kathy Goldwasser, Neil Gotanda, Richard Lazarus, and Helan 
Page, and I thank Dan Keating, Steve Legomsky, Ron Levin, and the students in my Critical 
Race Theory seminar as well, for comments on and criticisms of earlier drafts of this article. I'm 
grateful for the very able research assistance of Loretta Haggard. Finally, and not least, this 
article could not have been completed without the support of my life partner, Dayna Deck. 
1. Race has many meanings. For the purposes of this article, I define white person loosely, as 
an individual of European descent who, following the prevailing system of racial classification, 
has no known trace of African or other non-European ancestry. I adopt this definition because 
the core of the concept of whiteness in this article is white racial hegemony in the United States. 
Individuals of known nonwhite ancestry are unlikely to fall into the transparency syndrome. For 
an insightful discussion of the complexities of racial classification, including the "one drop of 
blood" rule, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind'~ 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 23-36 (1991). 
2. As Alison Jaggar describes it, traditional liberalism views human beings "as individual 
atoms which in principle are separable from social molecules." ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST 
PoLmcs AND HUMAN NATURE 29 (1988). Thus individuals' "essential characteristics, their 
needs and interests, their capacities and desires, are given independently of their social context 
and are not created or even fundamentally altered by that context." Id. Liberal is used through-
out in the classical, rather than political, sense. 
953 
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ment. 3 The colorblindness principle also grows out of the historical 
development of race relations in the United States, in which, until 
quite recently, race-specific classifications have been the primary 
means of maintaining the supremacy of whites.4 In reaction to that 
experience, whites of good will tend to equate racial justice with the 
disavowal of race-conscious criteria of classification. 5 
Nevertheless, the pursuit of colorblindness progressively reveals it-
self to be an inadequate social policy if the ultimate goal is substantive 
racial justice. 6 Blacks continue to inhabit a very different America 
than do whites. 7 They experience higher rates of poverty and unem-
3. Some strands of liberal theory also posit rationality as the essential quality of the individ-
ual; they deem socially constructed characteristics, including those that are biological in origin 
but laden with social significance, such as race and gender, incidental to personal identity. Id. at 
28-29. Consequently, this liberal approach conceives meritocracy as a system in which benefits 
and burdens are distributed in accord with one's deeds - presumably the products of rational 
choice - rather than characteristics over which one has no apparent control. See ROBERT 
BLAUNER, RACIAL OPPRESSION IN AMERICA 267 (1972); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., To Each Ac-
cording to His Ability, From None According to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law of 
Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U. L. REv. 815 (1980); Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest/or 
Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 362-85 
(1988); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 
1990 DUKE L.!. 705, 709-10; Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989). 
4. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERI· 
CAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981). 
5. Scholars have analyzed the principle disapproving race consciousness under a variety of 
labels. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case/or Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1060 (1991) ("colorblindness"); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 
(1978) ("antidiscrimination principle"); Gotanda, supra note 1 ("formal-race"); D. Kennedy, 
supra note 3 ("colorblind meritocratic fundamentalism"); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 758 ("integrationism"). 
6. As will become apparent, I do not mean to suggest that race consciousness should be 
embraced on a merely temporary basis, with colorblindness remaining the long-term goal, a posi-
tion sometimes espoused by proponents of race-specific affirmative action. See, e.g., Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In order to get 
beyond racism, we first must take account of race. There is no other way."); J. Skelly Wright, 
Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 244 (1979). In-
stead, the vision offered here is of a transformed consciousness of race, one that begins with 
whites' reexamining and taking responsibility for our own consciousness of whiteness. For an 
argument that the existing constitutional rule is not, and cannot be, colorblind, see David A. 
Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REv. 99 (arguing that the prohibition against 
even accurate racial generalizations demonstrates that the existing rule is based on race-con-
sciousness rather than colorblindness). 
7. I focus on blacks as the group most centrally affected by white supremacy for two princi-
pal reasons. First, the dynamics of blacks' oppression are unique, as evidenced, for example, by 
the institutions of slavery and racial apartheid, which provide the core definition of race discrimi-
nation in this society. Second, I would like to encourage white readers to reexamine our habit of 
thinking of race discrimination as a monolithic phenomenon, and to reflect on the different forms 
it may take with respect to different nonwhite racial groups, issues, and circumstances. To re-
mind the reader that some, but certainly not all, of what I say about blacks applies equally to 
other racial groups, I intermittently will substitute nonwhite for black in the text. See Neil Go-
tanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186 (1985) (review-
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ployment8 and are more likely to live in environmentally undesirable 
locations than whites.9 They have more frequent and more severe 
medical problems, higher mortality rates, and receive less comprehen-
sive health care than whites.10 Blacks continue disproportionately to 
attend inferior and inadequate primary and secondary schools.11 Pro-
portionately fewer blacks than whites complete college, and those who 
do so still confront the "glass ceiling" after graduation.12 Blacks are 
no better off by many of these measures than they were twenty years 
ago, 13 and in the recent past even the colorblindness principle itself, 
once seen as a promise of a brighter future for blacks, has been 
deployed instead to block further black economic progress.14 
Arguments that race consciousness has a positive face have begun 
to appear in the legal literature. Critical race theorists in particular 
have focused on the salience of race to legal analysis, 15 arguing com-
ing PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983)) (arguing that analysis of issues as they affect 
nonblack racial minorities should differ from analysis with respect to blacks). 
I have chosen not to capitalize black. for reasons that are, paradoxically, related to Kim 
Crenshaw's reason for doing so. In her view, "Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minori-
ties,' constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun." 
Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. R.E.v. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988). However, part of the agenda 
for this article is to encourage white people to break free from our tendency to associate race with 
people of color, and to develop instead a positive racial awareness of whiteness. Accordingly, I 
think it most appropriate here either to capitalize both black and white, or to capitalize neither, 
and, in the interest of defusing potential charges of essentialism, I have opted for the latter. 
8. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS 93-106 (1992); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STA-
TISTICAL ABSfRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991, at 38, 386 (1991) [hereinafter STATISTICAL 
ABSrRACT]. 
9. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of 
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. R.E.v. (forthcoming March 1993). 
10. HACKER, supra note 8, at 231. 
11. See JONATHAN KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUALmES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 
(1991). 
12. HACKER, supra note 8, at 107-12, 234. 
13. See, e.g., STATISTICAL ABSfRACT, supra note 8, at 454 (reporting that median income of 
whites increased almost 10% from $32,713 in 1970 to $35,975 in 1989; for blacks the 1970 
median was $20,067 and in 1989 only $20,209, an increase of less than one percent). 
14. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny 
to all race-specific classifications, including those designed to remedy past discrimination); see 
also DERRICK.A. BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 123-39 (1987); Frances L. Ansley, 
Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. R.E.v. 
993, 1000, 1010-23 (1989) (both criticizing affirmative action doctrine); Donald E. Lively, The 
Supreme Court and Affirmative Action: Whose Classification Is Suspect?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 483, 486-87 (1990) (criticizing requirement of discriminatory intent). 
15. A partial listing of the very rapidly expanding critical race literature includes BELL, 
supra note 14; DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992); 
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); Ansley, supra note 14; 
John O. Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 
61 OR. L. R.E.v. 201 (1982); Crenshaw, supra note 7; Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in THE PoLmcs OF LA w 195 (David Kairys ed., 
2d ed. 1990); Harlan L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R.E.v. 435 (1987); 
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. 
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pellingly that race does and should matter in all aspects of the law, 
from legal doctrine and theory to the conduct of legal education and 
the composition of the legal academy.16 Many of these authors have 
articulated critiques of colorblindness in the course of developing the 
critical perspective on race. In addition, and perhaps in response to 
the critical race literature, two recent articles by authors not ordinarily 
associated with that movement focus more directly on whites' concep-
tualizations of colorblindness and race consciousness. 
Alexander Aleinikoff has argued that racial justice cannot be at-
tained absent recognition of the social significance of race; whites' in-
creased, color-conscious attention to black perspectives and experience 
is a crucial ingredient in the effort to eradicate the difference race has 
made in this society.17 Gary Peller has described the historical devel-
opment of contemporary antidiscrimination norms. He argues that in-
tegrationism - colorblindness expressed as social policy - holds the 
dominant position it does in white ideology at least in part in response 
to the "threat" that the black nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s 
posed to whites.1s 
Each of these insightful articles, however, tends to align race con-
sciousness with consciousness of blackness, emphases which may be 
largely the consequence of the subjects these authors address: race-
conscious affirmative action and black nationalism, respectively.19 
REv. 2411 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado, Storytelling]; Richard Delgado, Campus Antiraclsm 
Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991); Freeman, supra 
note 3; Freeman, supra note 5; Gotanda, supra note 1; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism 
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) 
[hereinafter Lawrence, Unconscious Racism]; Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him 
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the 
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987) [here-
inafter Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom]; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: 
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of 
America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Low, and a Jurisprudence for the Lost Reconstruction, 100 
YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) [hereinafter Matsuda, Accent Discrimination]; Gerald Torres, Local 
Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1043 (1988); Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio By Precedent and 
Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625; Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra 
of Federal Indian Low: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's 
Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REv. 219; Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggres-
sively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 
103 (1987). 
16. On the latter, see K.imberle W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy 
in Legal Education, 11 NATL. BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: 
Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984). 
17. See Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 1113-25. 
18. See Peller, supra note 5, at 820-44. 
19. Note, however, that Peller's is a historical account of the association of race conscious-
ness with black nationalism, on the one band, and integrationism with white liberalism, on the 
other. He concludes his analysis with a call for whites to "reinterpret our role in race relations so 
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Nevertheless, caution is in order, because whites' tendency to focus 
our attention in matters of race on nonwhites can be just one more 
building block in the edifice of white supremacy. Whites' endeavors to 
understand our own and blacks' ways of thinking about blackness are 
never unimportant, but a thorough reexamination of race conscious-
ness ought to feature a careful consideration of whites' racial self-
conception. 
The most striking characteristic of whites' consciousness of white-
ness is that most of the time we don't have any. I call this the trans-
parency phenomenon: the tendency of whites not to think about 
whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that 
are white-specific. Transparency often is the mechanism through 
which white decisionmakers who disavow white supremacy impose 
white norms on blacks. Transparency operates to require black assim-
ilation even when pluralism is the articulated goal; it affords substan-
tial advantages to whites over blacks even when decisionmakers intend 
to effect substantive racial justice. 
Reconceptualizing white race consciousness means doing the hard 
work of developing a positive white racial identity, one neither 
founded on the implicit acceptance of white racial domination nor 
productive of distributive effects that systematically advantage 
whites.20 One step in that process is the deconstruction of trans-
parency in the context of white decisionmaking.21 We can work to 
make explicit the unacknowledged whiteness of facially neutral crite-
ria of decision, and we can adopt strategies that counteract the influ-
ence of unrecognized white norms. These approaches permit white 
decisionmakers to incorporate pluralist means of achieving our aims, 
and thus to contribute to the dismantling of white supremacy. Mak-
ing nonobvious white norms explicit, and thus exposing their contin-
gency, can begin to define for white people a coequal role in a racially 
that we might self-consciously understand ourselves as whites, as having a particular identity that 
was historically constructed through the economy of race relations." Id. at 847. This article 
attempts to contribute to that project. 
20. According to psychologist Janet Helms, a leading author on racial identity theory, the 
development of a healthy white racial identity requires the individual to overcome those aspects 
of racism - whether individual, institutional, or cultural - that have become a part of that 
person's identity, and in addition to "accept his or her own Whiteness, the cultural implications 
of being White, and define a view of Self as a racial being that does not depend on the perceived 
superiority of one racial group over another." Janet E. Helms, Toward a Model of White Racial 
Identity Development, in BLACK AND WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY 49 (Janet E. Helms ed., 1990). 
21. I define white decisionmaking expansively, to include any instance in which whites play a 
significant role in formulating operative norms, rules, or criteria of decision, even if they are 
administered by blacks. Of course, at the margins, determining whether decisionmaking is 
"white" may appear a tricky task. However, given the reality of white supremacy and the perva-
siveness of the transparency phenomenon, false negatives are more worrisome than false 
positives. 
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diverse society.22 
In constitutional law, facially race-neutral criteria of decision that 
carry a racially disproportionate impact violate the Equal Protection 
Clause only if adopted with a racially discriminatory intent.23 This 
rule provides an excellent vehicle for reconsidering white race con-
sciousness, because it perfectly reflects the prevailing white ideology of 
colorblindness and the concomitant failure of whites to scrutinize the 
whiteness of facially neutral norms.24 In addition, the discriminatory 
intent rule is the existing doctrinal means of regulating facially neutral 
government decisionmaking. When government imposes transpar-
ently white norms it participates actively in the maintenance of white 
supremacy, a stance I understand the Fourteenth Amendment to pro-
hibit. 25 We need, therefore, to reevaluate the existing discriminatory 
intent rule from the perspective of the transparency phenomenon, and 
to consider a revised approach to disparate impact cases that imple-
ments the insights gained from that reassessment. 
Perhaps an ideal equal protection rule would address all the nu-
merous ways that race influences facially neutral white decisionmak-
ing, from stereotyping and unconscious or repressed racial bias to 
conscious but covert discrimination, but tllls article does not attempt 
to construct a rule or set of rules to reach all violations of the constitu-
tional equality guarantee. While acknowledging that different rules 
might be appropriate in different contexts, this article will single out 
22. Gerald Torres has explained the way existing antidiscrimination law, while rejecting 
meaningful remedies for historical discrimination, nevertheless has created the conceptual space 
for valorizing cultural pluralism. See Torres, supra note 15, at 1068·69. For a description of 
cultural pluralism, see Kevin M. Fong, Comment, Cultural Pluralism, 13 HARV. C.R.·C.L. L. 
REV. 133 (1978). 
Becoming self-consciously white can be a painful process, because whiteness situates us as 
heirs of a legacy of exploitation and domination of nonwhites, a history upon which most would 
likely prefer not to dwell. At the same time, however, increasing our awareness of whiteness 
presents an opportunity to reconceive the egalitarian ideals by which we often say we are defined. 
Just as whiteness renders us privileged and powerful, it equally positions us as able substantially 
to reconstruct the meaning of race in our society. 
23. In this article I make no distinctions among motive, purpose, and intent. 
24. Most fundamentally, the requirement of discriminatory intent embodies a colorblindness 
perspective insofar as it views all, and only, decisions -that overtly or covertly take race into 
account as constitutionally impermissible, but rejects the view that unequal outcomes ought to be 
equally constitutionally suspect. See infra text accompanying notes 70-72 for a discussion of 
additional ways in which the existing discriminatory intent rule reflects the dominant white ide· 
ology of race. 
Of course, the Supreme Court's current affirmative action doctrine, which mandates strict . 
scrutiny of all race-specific government decisionmaking, is also an expression of the colorblind· 
ness principle. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality 
opinion); 488 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Aleinikolf, supra note 5, at 1060-65; 
Paul Brest, Affirmative Action and the Constitution: Three Theories, 72 IoWA L. REV. 281 
(1987). 
25. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. l, 11 (1967); infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text. 
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transparency for special consideration. The imposition of transpar-
ently white norms is a unique form of unconscious discrimination, one 
that cannot be assimilated to the notion of irrationalism that is central 
to the liberal ideology of racism. 26 While racial stereotyping can be 
condemned as the failure accurately to perceive the individual for who 
he really is, and bias as the inability to exclude subjective misconcep-
tions or hostilities, or both, from one's decisionmaking processes, 
transparency exemplifies the structural aspect of white supremacy. 
Beyond the individual forms of racism that stereotyping, bias, and 
hostility represent lie the vast terrains of institutional racism - the 
maintenance of institutions that systematically advantage whites -
and cultural racism - the usually unstated assumption that white cul-
ture is superior to all others. 27 Because the liberal gravitates toward 
abstract individualism and its predicates, she generally fails to recog-
nize or to address the more pervasive harms that institutional and cul-
tural white supremacy inflict.28 The exercise of focusing exclusively 
on the transparency phenomenon as an exemplar of structural racism, 
then, has transformative potential for the white liberal, both on the 
personal level and as a springboard for reflection on what it means for 
government genuinely to provide the equal protection of_ the laws.29 
26. See Peller, supra note 5, at 768-69. Peller provides a useful list of texts setting forth the 
cognitive or individualist conception of racism, id. at 768 n.16, and makes clear that this way of 
thinking about race is highly problematic. See id. at 844-47. Related discussions of the connec-
tion between rationalism and dominant conceptions of race discrimination can be found in 
Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 1067-68; Gotanda, supra note 1, at 43-44; Lawrence, Unconscious 
Racism, supra note 15, at 330. 
In emphasizing the unconscious forms of racism, I mean neither to discount the continuing 
presence of overt white hostility toward blacks nor to deny the reality of the modem forms of 
whites' belief in the cultural inferiority of black people. See Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 1376-81; 
Peggy C. Davis, Law As Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989). 
27. See JAMES M. JONES, PREJUDICE AND RACISM 129-31, 147-49 (1972). Jones defines 
individual racism as the belief that black people as a group are inferior to whites. Id. at 118. I 
would elaborate Jones' three categories to include unconscious forms of individual, institutional, 
and cultural racism. For example, individual racism may encompass conscious or unconscious 
attitudes and behaviors that reflect, in one way or another, the belief in white superiority. See 
Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 15, at 328-44. Jones does recognize the unconscious 
dimension of institutional racism, defining it as the maintenance of institutions that advantage 
whites "whether or not the individuals maintaining those practices have racist intentions." JONES, 
supra, at 131. Similarly, the imposition of white cultural norms on blacks should be considered 
cultural racism whether or not the white decisionmaker harbors a conscious belief in the superi-
ority of white culture. See Robert E. Friedman, Institutional Racism: How to Discriminate With-
out Really Trying, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 384 (Thomas F. 
Pettigrew ed., 1975). · 
28. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. Though uncommon, it is of course possible 
to recognize and address structural forms of racism within a liberal conceptual framework. In-
deed, it might be said that this article's argument that the transparency phenomenon demon-
strates that ostensibly race-oriented decisionmaking is in fact race-specific constitutes just such 
an attempt. 
29. Of course, a transparency-conscious constitutional rule is not the only way one might set 
out to combat the effects of transparency in government decisionmaking; legislative and adminis-
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Part I briefly reviews the case law that has established and elabo-
rated the requirement of discriminatory intent. I discuss the theoreti-
cal background against which Washington v. Davis was decided, a 
debate over the possibility and propriety of judicial review of legisla-
tive motive. I suggest that the significant institutional difficulties asso-
ciated with the triumphant discriminatory intent rule, together with 
the many substantive criticisms leveled against it, might lead one to 
expect to see relative doctrinal instability here. On the contrary, the 
requirement of discriminatory intent has been one of the most stable 
doctrines in modem constitutional law. I conclude with the specula-
tion that the rule owes its longevity, at least in part, to its conformity 
with distinctively white ways of thinking about race discrimination. 
Part II invites the white reader to undertake the project of becom-
ing conscious of transparency. I pose questions designed to prompt 
whites to reflect on this phenomenon, and I offer a story illustrative of 
some of the ways transparency can influence white decisionmaking. I 
then argue that recognizing transparency impels adoption of a radical 
skepticism regarding facially race-neutral criteria of decision. The 
skeptical stance operates as a presumption against the neutrality in 
fact of any facially neutral criterion of decision employed by a white 
decisionmaker. 
In Part III, I reexamine the requirement of discriminatory intent 
from the perspective of transparency. The existing rule sharply distin-
guishes conscious from unconscious reliance on race in decisionmak-
ing; though both constitute race-specific decisionmaking, only the 
former is constitutionally impermissible. Transparency undermines 
each of two possible justifications for the Court's position: that uncon-
scious discrimination is relatively rare, and that conscious discrimina-
tion is relatively more blameworthy than unconscious discrimination. 
This Part concludes with a discussion of a theoretical alternative to the 
practice of blaming. 
Part IV proposes an alternative to the existing discriminatory in-
tent rule. The principal features of the proposed rule are that it places 
on government the burden of justifying all facially neutral criteria of 
decision that have disparate effects, it mandates pluralist interpreta-
tions of government purposes whenever possible, and it requires gov-
ernment to adopt plaintiff-formulated means of achieving those 
purposes whenever such means are at least as effective as existing 
measures. I then consider two objections to the proposed rule: that it 
trative approaches might be equally, or more, effective. However, the scope of this article is 
limited to the ways a constitutional rule might contribute to the effort. 
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abandons the colorblindness principle, and that it engages the courts 
too deeply in economic redistribution. I argue in reply that a carefully 
conceived race consciousness, one that begins with whites' conscious-
ness of whiteness, can provide better distributive racial justice than the 
colorblindness principle and is at least equally consistent with the un-
derlying liberal values of equality and autonomy. With regard to the 
institutional critique, I conclude that the proposed rule indeed has 
some redistributive effects but that the goal of combatting structural 
racism clearly justifies these effects. 
I. THE REQUIREMENT OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT 
The Supreme Court first set forth the discriminatory intent re-
quirement in 1976, in Washington v. Davis. 30 In that case the Court 
addressed the constitutionality of "Test 21," a written examination de-
veloped by the U.S. Civil Service Commission and administered to ap-
plicants for positions as officers in the Metropolitan Police 
Department of the District of Columbia.31 Two rejected black appli-
cants argued that Test 21 was racially discriminatory in that its effect 
was to disqualify black applicants at approximately four times the rate 
of white applicants; the plaintiffs did not allege intentional discrimina-
tion. 32 The challengers lost in the District Court33 but were, tempo-
rarily, more successful on appeal: the Court of Appeals concluded 
that the applicable constitutional standard should be borrowed from 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 34 a Title VII case. 35 In Griggs, as it was 
then understood, the Supreme Court had ruled that disparate impact 
alone, without proof of discriminatory intent, would be adequate to 
support the finding of a statutory violation absent proof by the em-
ployer that the facially neutral criterion in question was related to job 
30. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
31. 426 U.S. at 234-35. The full text of Test 21 appears at Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 
956, 967-76 (D.C. Cir. 1975), revd., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). It was a multiple 
choice examination that included questions on vocabulary, analogies, and reading comprehen-
sion, plus two categories of questions best characterized as designed to test familiarity with main-
stream culture. One set of questions asked the examinee to identify the correct policy 
justification behind a specified legal rule. For example, the applicant had to choose the best 
answer to "The purpose of trademarks is to ...• " Question 13, 512 F.2d at 968. The second 
category of cultural questions required interpretation of aphorisms, such as "Habits are at first 
cobwebs, at last cables," and "They wrangle about an egg and let the hens fly away." Questions 
52 & 63, 512 F.2d at 973, 974. 
32. Davis, 426 U.S. at 235. 
33. The District Court decided challengers' constitutional claim on a motion for partial sum-
mary judgment. 426 U.S. at 234. 
34. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
35. Though plaintiffs in Davis had raised other statutory claims, they had not pursued a Title 
VII action because it was not then applicable to the federal government. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238 
~m . . 
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performance. 36 Though the District of Columbia petitioners chal-
lenged only the Court of Appeals' application of the Griggs approach, 
not the standard itself, the Supreme Court viewed the lower court's 
reliance on Griggs as plain error and set itself the task of correcting the 
mistake. 37 The constitutional rule, the Court said, is that "the invidi-
ous quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ulti-
mately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."38 Facially 
neutral laws with racially disparate effects, therefore, receive strict 
scrutiny only on a demonstration of discriminatory intent.39 
Justice White's opinion for the Davis Court rested the intent re-
quirement principally on two arguments. First, the Court rejected a 
"group rights" approach to race discrimination.40 Notwithstanding 
that the failure rate for blacks as a group was higher than for whites, 
individual black applicants who failed the facially neutral test, the 
Court said, "could no more successfully claim that the test denied 
them equal protection than could white applicants who also failed."41 
Second, the Court expressed concern that a rule mandating strict scru-
36. The Griggs opinion reads: "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business neces-
sity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be re-
lated to job performance, the practice is prohibited." 401 U.S. at 431. The Court elaborated: 
"[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or 
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to 
measuring job capability." 401 U.S. at 432. The language seems reasonably straightforward: 
intent is no part of a disparate impact claim. However, chiefly because the facts of the case 
strongly suggested that the employer had adopted the challenged facially neutral job require· 
ments as a pretext for discrimination, some have read the Griggs disparate impact approach to 
provide no more than an indirect method of proving discriminatory intent. See infra notes 48-51 
and accompanying text. For a different argument supporting the second interpretation of Griggs, 
see George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimina-
tion, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987). 
37. Davis, 426 U.S. at 238. 
38. 426 U.S. at 240. 
39. The Davis Court allowed that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred 
from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more 
heavily on one race than another." 426 U.S. at 242. However, it appears that in most contexts 
the existence of any nondiscriminatory explanation will defeat the inference of invidious intent. 
Cf Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960): 
If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion 
would be irresistible ... that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and 
colored voters . . . • 
. . . Against this claim the respondents have never suggested, either in their brief or in 
oral argument, any countervailing municipal function which Act 140 is designed to serve. 
364 U.S. at 341-42 (emphases added). 
40. Owen Fiss provided the early exposition of a group-disadvantaging principle as a founda· 
tion for what seems to be a pure impact approach to facially neutral government decisionmaking 
in Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-70 
(1976). Alan Freeman notes, however, that whether some notion of intent is relevant to Fiss' 
analysis remains uncertain. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 1062 n.57. 
41. Davis, 426 U.S. at 246. 
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tiny in all disparate effects cases would engage it in far-ranging eco-
nomic redistribution. Such a rule "would be far reaching and would 
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of 
tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may 
be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the 
more aflluent white."42 
Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion in Davis, but wrote sep-
arately to explain that in his view the distinction between discrimina-
tory impact and discriminatory purpose was not as bright as it might 
at first seem, because "[f]requently the most probative evidence of in-
tent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than 
evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For nor-
mally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences 
of his deeds."43 The Court later clarified its position on this issue in 
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 44 a sex discrimination case. Feeney 
challenged a Massachusetts statute granting a nearly absolute prefer-
ence in state civil service employment to veterans; she contended that 
because the class of veterans was overwhelmingly male, the preference 
inevitably and foreseeably operated to exclude women from the civil 
service. The Court rejected Feeney's argument, and with it Stevens' 
foreseeable effects approach, adopting instead the rule that discrimina-
tory intent means that the decisionmaker chose a challenged facially 
neutral course of action" 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its ad-
verse effects upon an identifiable group. "45 
The Davis rule represented a significant departure from the Griggs 
approach to disparate impact claims. The Title VII plaintiff bore the 
burden of persuasion only on the factual issue of disparate effects; the 
burden of production and persuasion then shifted to the employer to 
show that the challenged practice was a "business necessity."46 A lib-
eral reading of the Griggs analysis saw it as standing for the proposi-
tion that unjustified racially disparate effects, standing alone, 
constituted a violation of Title VII; intent played no part in a disparate 
impact claim. On this interpretation, Davis rested on an obviously 
42. 426 U.S. at 248. 
43. 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
44. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
45. 442 U.S. at 278-79. 
46. The burden of production requires the party to produce admissible evidence sufficient to 
raise a genuine question of fact on the issue; the burden of persuasion requires the party to 
persuade the fact finder, ordinarily by the preponderance of the evidence standard, on the issue. 
See Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of 
Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205, 1216 (1981). The history of the business necessity 
doctrine is discussed infra note 142. 
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and, to many, inexplicably, different conception of discrimination than 
did Griggs. ~1 
On the other hand, some interpreted Griggs only to establish an 
indirect method of proving discriminatory intent.48 Even on this read-
ing, however, Davis set forth a much less "plaintiff friendly" rule than 
did Griggs. Plaintiff's showing of disproportionate effects was under-
stood to raise an inference of discriminatory purpose that placed on 
the Title VII defendant a substantial burden of rebuttal. 49 In contrast, 
the constitutional disparate impact challenger seemed to bear the bur-
den of persuasion throughout. so As the Feeney case illustrated, at 
least in the realm of employment discrimination, the existence of any 
nonracial explanation for a demonstrated disparate impact would be 
sufficient to defeat the inference of discriminatory purpose.51 In effect, 
in constitutional cases, the defendant had only the burden of produc-
tion, but not of persuasion, on the question of a "racially neutral" ex-
planation for the disproportionate effects. 
The Court's reluctance to infer discriminatory intent from dispa-
rate effects in constitutional cases might be symptomatic of the diffi-
culty it had wrestled with for some time prior to Davis in determining 
the proper role of legislative motive in constitutional analysis.52 In 
1960 the Court had stated that "[a]cts generally lawful may become 
unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end."53 The idea that 
47. On the comparison between the Title VII and constitutional disparate impact rules, the 
Davis Court said only: "We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating 
claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, 
and we decline to do so today." 426 U.S. at 239. 
48. George Rutherglen argues that this is the more plausible reading of Griggs. Rutherglen, 
supra note 36, at 1299-311. For more comprehensive accounts of the two interpretations of 
Griggs described here, and of the theories of equality that they embody, see Robert Belton, The 
Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the Future of Title VIL· The Need for a 
Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POLY. REV. 223 (1990); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair 
Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235 (1971); L. Camille Hebert, Redefining the Burdens of 
Proo/in Title VII Litigation: Will the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards Cove and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1990?, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
49. See Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1312-14. 
SO. A recent empirical study suggests that the more significant impact of the intent require-
ment may be a low volume of intent cases filed, rather than low success rates for plaintiffs. 
Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal 
Standards Work?, 76 CoRNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991). 
51. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 
1115-16 (1989). Ortiz hypothesizes that the Court's uneven application of the intent requirement 
reflects interest balancing; when interests such as education, voting, or jury service are at stake, 
plaintiff has a relatively easier time proving discriminatory intent. Id. at 1140-41. 
52. John Ely described the Court's confusion concerning motive review as having reached 
"disaster proportions" by 1970. John H. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation In Con-
stitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1207 (1970). 
53. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (quoting Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918)). Gomillion considered the constitutionality of a scheme to 
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legislative action might be invalidated on account of a perceived im-
permissible purpose seemed to take hold in a series of religion cases. s4 
In 1968, however, the Court reversed direction, stating in the draft 
card burning case, United States v. O'Brien, ss that "[t]he decisions of 
this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assump-
tion that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the 
assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to 
be exerted."S6 The Court did not, however, change its earlier position 
with respect to the religion cases, so the matter could hardly be seen as 
settled.s7 The final pre-Davis pronouncement came in 1971, in Palmer 
v. Thompson. ss In that case, petitioners challenged the decision by 
Jackson, Mississippi to close its public swimming pools in the wake of 
a federal court judgment declaring that the operation of segregated 
public facilities constituted a denial of equal protection; they argued 
that the closing was unconstitutional because it had been motivated by 
the city's desire to avoid integrating the pools. The Court reiterated 
its O'Brien position: 
[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal 
protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for 
it .... 
It is true there is language in some of our cases interpreting the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments which may suggest that the motive or 
purpose behind a law is relevant to its constitutionality. But the focus in 
those cases was on the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the moti-
vation which led the States to behave as they did. s9 
Many of the federal courts of appeals interpreted the language of the 
Palmer opinion to mean that legislative motive was entirely irrelevant 
to constitutional analysis; it gave them additional reason to conclude, 
like the Court of Appeals in Davis, that the Griggs rule should be ap-
plied to constitutional disparate impact cases.60 
redraw the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama in such a:iway that all but a very few black voters 
crune to reside outside the city limits. The resulting boundary lines, in the Court's words, formed 
"an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure." 364 U.S. at 340. No explanation for the bizarre shape 
other than race discrimination was possible. See supra note 39. 
54. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
(1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961). 
55. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
56. 391 U.S. at 383 (quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)). 
57. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1968) (citing, inter alia, Mc-
Gowan and Schempp, but remarking that the test developed by the religion cases "is not easy to 
apply"). 
58. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
59. 403 U.S. at 224, 225 (citations omitted). 
60. See, e.g., Munoz Vargas v. Romero Barcelo, 532 F.2d 765, 766 (1st Cir. 1976); Tyler v. 
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The problems with motive review had been described in O'Brien. 
Scholars had characterized them as issues of ascertainability, futility, 
and disutility.61 The difficulty of ascertaining legislative motive was 
apparent: "What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a 
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it 
•••• "
62 Futility referred to the ability of the legislature to rehabilitate 
an invalidated law simply by reenacting it with a recitation of "permis-
sible" purposes. Disutility represented the concern that declaring leg-
islative acts unconstitutional on the basis of motive alone might result 
in the invalidation of laws that were otherwise beneficial in their 
operation. 
John Hart Ely and Paul Brest led the way in making the case/or 
motive review. 63 Each acknowledged the strength of the objections to 
such review, but each reached the conclusion, by somewhat different 
routes, that the need for a mode of review that would reach illicit gov-
ernment objectives outweighed its disadvantages. 64 Though the argu-
ment that the presence of an illicit motive is a sufficient condition for 
judicial invalidation of a legislative act does not entail the proposition 
that such a motive ought to be a necessary condition for invalidation, 
the contributions of Ely and Brest clearly helped pave the way for the 
Davis requirement of discriminatory intent. 6s 
Despite these scholarly underpinnings, there were several compel-
Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1095 (5th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Bridgeport 
Guardians, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 482 F.2d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir. 1973); Hawkins v. Town of 
Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane) (per curiam); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 
725, 732-33 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 950 (1972); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1200 (D. Md. 1972), modi-
fied and affd. sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973). 
61. For in-depth discussions of these issues, see Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Ap-
proach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. Cr. REV. 95, 119-28; Ely, 
supra note 52, at 1212-17. The problems of ascertainability, futility, and disutility arise similarly 
with respect to administrative decisionmaking, though the question of ascertainability might take 
on a somewhat different form in that context. Brest also considered a more exclusively legislative 
issue, impropriety - the lack of proper r'1'pect for the decision of a coordinate branch of govern· 
ment. See Brest, supra, at 128-30. 
62. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384. 
63. Ely, supra note 52; Brest, supra note 61. 
64. Ely argued for the necessity of motive review in certain limited circumstances, which he 
described as cases of random and discretionary choice. See Ely, supra note 52, at 1228-49. Brest 
argued for a more comprehensive approach to motive review. See Brest, supra note 61, at 130-
31, 134-43. 
65. The Supreme Court cited Brest's work in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.12 (1977), a case that solidified the requirement of dis-
criminatory intent. 
The problem of motive review represented a dilemma for process theory. In its emphases on 
discrete roles for the coordinate branches and on considerations of institutional competence, 
process theory seemed to advise against judicial review of legislative motives. See, e.g., Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 33 & n.117 
(1959). On the other hand, as Ely and Brest recognized, process theory also needed an account 
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ling reasons to predict that the Davis rule would have a troubled his-
tory. First, the institutional factors counseling against judicial review 
of legislative motives are still operative. Second, we might expect the 
anomaly created by adopting significantly different approaches to dis-
parate impact analysis in Title VII and constitutional cases to trouble 
the Court. Finally, the discriminatory intent requirement has borne 
steady and intense academic criticism.66 Nevertheless, the discrimina-
tory intent requirement has been remarkably stable, surviving un-
changed for more than fifteen years. The rule's persistence over a 
period characterized by the Court's modification, reinterpretation, and 
outright overruling of dozens of precedents67 calls for an attempt at 
of the legitimacy oflegislative action; legislative consideration of illicit objectives was a paradigm. 
case of process failure. 
The basic outline of political process theory- the application of process theory to the legisla-
tive process in particular-had been laid out in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), and in a short article by Richard A. Givens, The Impartial 
Constitutional Principles Supporting Brown v. Board of Education, 6 How. L.J. 179 (1960). 
However, the visibilit9' of Ely's and Brest's articles in the early 1970s on motive review may have 
marked a turning point in the evolution of process theory into its political process refinement. 
For an illuminating description of process theory in the 1950s, and the argument that the early 
process theorists failed to consider the problem of legislative competence, see Gary Peller, Neu-
tral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561, 610-12 (1988). Several perspectives on 
motive review are included in Symposium, Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. R.Ev. 925 
(1978). 
66. Since the Court's decision in the Davis case, critics of the requirement of discriminatory 
intent have been numerous. As Chuck Lawrence has shown, the cnticisms of Davis revolve 
around two principal themes: first, that an intent requirement places too heavy a burden on the 
"wrong" side of the dispute; second, that the harms of racial inequality exist independently of 
discriminatory intent. See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 15, at 319-20. The critics 
include Gayle Binion, ''Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 
397 (advocating "serious" scrutiny in all disparate impact cases); Theodore Eisenberg, Dispropor-
tionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 36 
(1977) (proposing heightened scrutiny when challenger is able to demonstrate some race-depen-
dent decision was the cause·in-fact of the challenged disproportionate impact); Freeman, supra 
note 5 (claiming that discriminatory intent requirement reflects "perpetrator" rather than "vic-
tim" perspective); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 91 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 50-52 (1977) (contending that stigma of caste cannot be confined to 
purposefully stigmatizing behavior); Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 15 (expanding 
doctrine to reach some varieties of unconscious discrimination); Ortiz, supra note 51 (arguing 
that doctrine is better explained as weighing interests than as regulation of inputs to legislative 
decisionmaking); Michael J. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 
125 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 540 (1977) (arguing that some form of intermediate scrutiny should be 
triggered in all disproportionate impact cases); Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimina-
tion, 96 HARV. L. R.Ev. 828 (1983) (arguing for extended causal chain linking discriminatory 
intent and injury to blacks); Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and the Consequences of the 
Social History of Racism, 40 ARK. L. R.Ev. 677 (1987) (contending that substantial burden of 
justification should attach to government actions having foreseeable discriminatory effects); 
David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 935 
(1989) (claiming that existing discriminatory intent rule does reach unconscious discrimination, 
and, so construed, "defeats itselP'); Pamela S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens 
Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111 (1983) (arguing for a broad-
ened conception of intent). 
67. In Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), the Court acknowledged 34 previous cases 
spanning two decades in which it had overruled constitutional precedents in whole or in part, 
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explanation. 
One relatively simple explanation for the stability of the require-
ment of discriminatory purpose is its intuitive appeal, or more pre-
cisely the appeal of the principles it embodies. Colorblindness is 
extremely attractive to white liberals, 68 and process theory's promise 
to regulate only the inputs to legislative decisionmaking, but not the 
substance of the resulting decisions, is extremely attractive to jurists 
confronting the countermajoritarian difficulty. 69 But there is, I think, 
another explanation: the Davis rule reflects a distinctively white way 
of thinking about race. 
First, white people tend to view intent as an essential element of 
racial harm; nonwhites do not. The white perspective can be, and fre-
quently is, expressed succinctly and without any apparent perceived 
need for justification: "[W]ithout concern about past and present in-
tent, racially discriminatory effects of legislation would be quite inno-
cent."70 For black people, however, the fact of racial oppression exists 
largely independent of the motives or intentions of its perpetrators. 71 
Second, both in principle and in application the Davis rule presupposes 
the existence of race-neutral decisionmaking. Whites' level of confi-
dence in race neutrality is much greater than nonwhites'; a skeptic 
(nonwhite, more likely than not) would not adopt a rule that presumes 
the neutrality of <?riteria of decision absent the specific intent to do 
111 S. Ct. at 2610 n.1, and at least one instance of constitutional overruling was omitted from the 
Court's list. See Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Commn., 461 U.S. 375 
(1983) (overruling Public Util. Commn. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927)), Of 
those 36 cases (including Payne itseli), 29 were decided either during the same term as, or subse· 
quent to, the Washington v. Davis decision. In addition, there have been several cases in which at 
least one member of the Court has expressed a willingness to overrule a constitutional precedent. 
E.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (plurality would overrule Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277 (1983)); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (plurality would 
abandon Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 
261 (1980) (plurality would overrule Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), as 
limited by Industrial Commn. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947)). In other cases a dissenter has 
accused the majority of having overruled sub silentio. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
112 S. Ct. 2791, 2880-81 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 304 
(1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 827 (1982) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
68. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
69. For an argument that process theory fails to deliver on its promises in the disparate 
impact cases, see Ortiz, supra note 51, at 1113-19. The general criticism that process theory 
cannot escape substantive commitments has been advanced most persuasively in Bruce A. Acker-
man, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 733-40 (1985), and Laurence H. Tribe, 
The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). 
The appeal of process theory remains strong, however. See generally Symposium on Democracy 
and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REv. 631 (1991). 
70. Robert W. Bennett, ''Mere" Rationality In Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and 
Democratic Theory, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1076 (1979). 
71. See Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 19 CAL. L. 
REv. 1511, 1557-58 n.131 (1991); Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 15, at 319-20. 
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racial harm. Finally, retaining the intent requirement in the face of its 
demonstrated failure to effectuate substantive racial justice is indica-
tive of a complacency concerning, or even a commitment to, the racial 
status quo that can only be enjoyed by those who are its beneficiaries 
-by white people.72 
A raised white consciousness of race would produce a very differ-
ent rule in disparate impact cases. In particular, white people who 
take seriously the transparency phenomenon, and who want to foster 
racial justice, will look for ways to diffuse transparency's effects and to 
relativize previously unrecognized white norms. Existing doctrinal 
tools are adequate, in large measure, to accomplish these goals, if they 
are tailored to correct the evil of transparency. The process of recon-
structing a disparate impact rule must begin, however, with a careful 
examination of the transparency phenomenon. 
II. DECONSTRUCTING RACE NEUTRALITY 
In this Part the white reader is invited to reexamine her customary 
ways of thinking about whiteness and, consequently, to reevaluate her 
attitude toward the concept of race-neutral decisionmaking. There is 
a profound cognitive dimension to the material and social privilege 
that attaches to whiteness in this society, in that the white person has 
an everyday option not to think of herself in racial terms at all. In 
fact, whites appear to pursue that option so habitually that it may be a 
defining characteristic of whiteness: to be white is not to think about 
it. 73 I label the tendency for whiteness to vanish from whites' self-
perception the transparency phenomenon. 74 
72. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Di-
lemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. Sl8, S22-23 (1980). 
73. Some social scientists have recognized and discussed this phenomenon. See Robert W. 
Terry, The Negative Impact on White Values, in IMPACI'S OF RACISM ON WHITE AMERICANS 
119, 120 (Benjamin P. Bowser & Raymond G. Hunt eds., 1981) ("To be white in America is not 
to have to think about it.") (emphasis omitted); Judy H. Katz & Allen Ivey, White Awareness: 
The Frontier of Racism Awareness Training, SS PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE J. 48S, 486 (1977) 
("White people do not see themselves as white.") (emphasis omitted). Janet Helms concludes 
that "it appears that most Whites have no consistent conception of a positive White identity or 
consciousness. As a consequence, Whites may feel threatened by the actual or presupposed pres-
ence of racial consciousness in non-White racial groups." Helms, supra note 20, at SO. 
Transparency has been noted by some legal scholars as well. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 
S, at 1066; Freeman, supra note 3, at 357-S8; Gotanda, supra note 1, at S9 n.239. 
74. Any claim about whites as a group, like claims about nonwhite groups or about the 
category "women," raises potential concerns about essentialism. See ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, 
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988). I suspect 
there is more homogeneity among whites' experience of transparency than there is among the 
experiences of whites or nonwhites regarding most other issues, but I do not ask the reader to 
accept this assertion on faith. Rather, I ask each white reader to verify in her own experience the 
claim that we tend to be unaware of whiteness. See infra note 81. On the problem of essentialism 
as it applies to feminist legal theory, see Harris, supra note lS. 
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I invite the white reader to explore white race consciousness by 
reflecting on her own experience with transparency; in section II.A I 
pose a series of questions designed to aid in that process of introspec-
tion. Those who are, or become, convinced that transparency is a per-
vasive fact of whites' conceptualization of ourselves have reason to be 
skeptical of purportedly race-neutral decisionmaking by white deci-
sionmakers. The argument advanced in section 11.B, in summary, is 
that because we tend not to see ourselves as white, we should not be 
confident of the race neutrality of criteria of decision formulated in 
predominantly white contexts. I propose that the white decisionmaker 
adopt a deliberate skepticism regarding the race neutrality of facially 
neutral criteria of decision. 
A. The Transparency Phenomenon 
On a recent trip to Washington, D. C. my life partner, who is white, 
was visiting a white friend and bringing her up to date on family events 
and activities. When she mentioned that I have been teaching a new 
course on Critical Race Theory, her friend appeared puzzled and sur-
prised. "But, " said the friend, "isn't she white?"15 
White people externalize race. For most whites, most of the time, 
to think or speak about race is to think or speak about people of color, 
or perhaps, at times, to reflect on oneself (or other whites) in relation 
to people of color. But we tend not to think of ourselves or our racial 
cohort as racially distinctive. Whites' "consciousness" of whiteness is 
predominantly unconsciousness of whiteness. We perceive and interact 
with other whites as individuals who have no significant racial charac-
teristics. In the same vein, the white person is unlikely to see or de-
scribe himself in racial terms, perhaps in part because his white peers 
do not regard him as racially distinctive. Whiteness is a transparent 
quality when whites interact with whites in the absence of people of 
color. Whiteness attains opacity, becomes apparent to the white mind, 
only in relation to, and contrast with, the "color" of nonwhites.76 
I do not mean to claim that white people are oblivious to the race 
of other whites. 77 Race is undeniably a powerful determinant of social 
75. This is a true story. For the reader who finds it distracting or irrelevant that I identify 
myself as lesbian in this story, I offer a brief explanation. In my view, though coming out as 
lesbian clearly plays a different role in the struggle against oppression than does the acquisition of 
self-consciousness of whiteness, each is crucial. Sexual orientation is no more irrelevant to per-
sonal identity than is race, or gender, or class. 
76. See BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS 54 (1990). 
77. Neil Gotanda calls this the technique of nonrecognition. Racial identity must first be 
recognized, then suppressed, so that race is "noticed, but not considered." Gotanda, supra note 
1, at 16-18. 
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status and so is always noticed, in a way that eye color, for example, 
may not be. 78 However, whites' social dominance allows us to relegate 
our own racial specificity to the realm of the subconscious. Whiteness 
is the racial norm. In this culture the black person, not the white, is 
the one who is different. 79 The black, not the white, is racially distinc-
tive. Once an individual is identified as white, his distinctively racial 
characteristics need no longer be conceptualized in racial terms; he 
becomes effectively raceless in the eyes of other whites. Whiteness is 
always a salient personal characteristic, but once identified, it fades 
almost instantaneously from white consciousness into transparency. 80 
The best "evidence" for the pervasiveness of the transparency phe-
nomenon will be the white reader's own experience: critically assess-
ing our habitual ways of thinking about ourselves and about other 
white people should bring transparency into full view. 81 The questions 
78. See Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach 
to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581, 585-86 (1977). 
79. See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 15, at 341-42. The interconnection be-
tween concepts of equality and the problem of the unstated norm is illuminated in MARTHA 
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 49-
78 (1990). 
80. The experiential asymmetry of race for white people that has just been described stands 
in sharp contrast to our insistence on a symmetrical legal analysis of race discrimination. "The 
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and some-
thing else when applied to a person of another color." City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 289-90 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). 
81. As noted above, social scientists have studied what I call the transparency phenomenon, 
and some legal scholars have mentioned it as well. See supra note 73. However, I do not rest my 
implicit claim that the transparency phenomenon is "real" - a better way of conceptualizing 
things - on the authority of social scientists or legal scholars, in part because they too must rely 
at bottom on the reported experience of white people. I believe we are more likely to take trans-
parency seriously if we recognize it in our own lives than if our only acquaintance with it is third-
hand "empirical" evidence. Moreover, as an epistemological matter I share Alan Freeman's 
assumptions that one can differentiate appearance from reality, that though there are no objective 
criteria of truth, one can know the world through experience, and that at times prevailing struc-
tures of thought distort one's own experiential knowledge. Freeman, supra note 3, at 322-23. 
Freeman's account of the process, and value, of critical reflection on consciousness is 
irreplaceable: 
Only through engagement with truth revealed to be more ideological than real can one 
decide for oneself the extent of one's previous self-deception. I don't think anyone is ex-
empt. There is a claim that ideology serves merely to comfort the oppressors by rational-
izing their oppressions as fair and natural. This, however, is too simple. I readily concede 
that there is no universality of experience, that there is always the risk of over-projecting 
one's own. One should therefore respect the diversity of experiences and voices produced by 
encounters with different "truths," and pay attention to them. Moreover, one should seek 
out and try to understand knowledges that have been silenced, or forms of local resistance 
that have gone undetected. This is not to downplay the importance of the prevailing cul-
ture, though. Everything in my experience tells me that ostensibly shared culture is power-
ful, that oppressed as well as oppressors participate in it, however differently, and that 
pervasive ideological forms can also serve to perpetuate patterns of domination and hierar-
chy. I do not suggest that one can simply "unthink" domination and make it go away. Yet 
I believe that collective "unthinking" is a good step toward positive political activity. 
Id. at 323. 
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that follow may provide some direction for the reader's reflections. 
In what situations do you describe yourself as white? Would you 
be likely to include white on a list of three adjectives that describe 
you?82 Do you think about your race as a factor in the way other 
whites treat you? For example, think about the last time some white 
clerk or salesperson treated you deferentially, or the last time the first 
taxi to come along stopped for you. Did you think, "That wouldn't 
have happened if I weren't white"? Are you conscious of yourself as 
white when you find yourself in a room occupied only by white peo-
ple? What if there are people of color present? What if the room is 
mostly nonwhite?S3 
Do you attribute your successes or failures in life to your white-
ness? Do you reflect on the ways your educational and occupational 
opportunities have been enhanced by your whiteness? What about the 
life courses of others? In your experience, at the time of Justice Sou-
ter's nomination, how much attention did his race receive in conversa-
tions among whites about his abilities and prospects for confirmation? 
Did you or your white acquaintances speculate on the ways his white-
ness might have contributed to his success, how his race may have 
affected his character and personality, or how his whiteness might pre-
dispose him to a racially skewed perspective on legal issues?84 
If your lover or spouse is white, how frequently do you reflect on 
that fact? Do you think of your white friends as your white friends, 
other than in contrast with your friends who are not white? Do you 
try to understand the ways your shared whiteness affects the interac-
tions between yourself and your white partner, friends, and acquaint-
ances? For example, perhaps you have become aware of the absence 
of people of color on some occasion. Did you move beyond that mo-
ment of recognition to consider how the group's uniform whiteness 
affected its interactions, agenda, process, or decisions? Do you inquire 
about the ways white persons you know have dealt with the fact, and 
82. Pat Cain reports that in her experience white women never include whiteness as one of 
the three adjectives. See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 208 (1989-90). 
83. Compare Justice Marshall's reflection: "[Y]ears ago, when I was a youngster, a Pullman 
porter told me that he had been in every city in this country ..• and he had never been in any city 
in the United States where he had to put his hand up in front of his face to find out he was Negro. 
I agree with him." Ruth Marcus, Plain-Spoken Marshall Spars with Reporters, WASH. POST, 
June 29, 1991, at Al, AlO. 
84. The obvious comparison here is to the role race was perceived to have played in the 
nomination and confirmation of Justice Clarence Thomas, a role that probably cannot be over-
stated. Of course, the different treatment of Souter and Thomas may reflect more than just the 
transparency phenomenon. However, facially race-neutral factors such as Souter's low public 
profile may themselves be examples of transparency: Could a black nominee possibly have filled 
Souter's political-strategic role for President Bush? 
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privilege, of their whiteness?85 
Imagine that I am describing to you a third individual who is not 
known to you. I say, for example, "She's good looking, but rather 
quiet," or "He's tall, dark, and handsome." If I do not specify the 
race of the person so described, is it not culturally appropriate, and 
expected, for you to assume she or he is white?86 
B. Race-Neutral Decisionmaking 
Like most kids, I liked to color things with crayons. If you wanted 
to draw a person with Crayola crayons back then, you used the "Flesh" 
crayon, a pinkish color that is now labeled ''Peach. " You could also 
draw an Indian with one of the red colors, or use a shade of brown, but 
we knew those weren't really skin colors. 87 
Transparency casts doubt on the concept of race-neutral decision-
making. Facially neutral criteria of decision formulated and applied 
by whites may be as vulnerable to the transparency phenomenon as is 
the race of white people itself. This Part suggests that whites should 
respond to the transparency phenomenon with a deliberate skepticism 
concerning race neutrality. 
At a minimum, transparency counsels that we not accept seem-
ingly neutral criteria of decision at face value. Most whites live and 
work in settings that are wholly or predominantly white. Thus whites 
rely on primarily white referents m formulating the norms and expec-
tations that become criteria of decision for white decisionmakers. 
Given whites' tendency not to be aware of whiteness, it's unlikely that 
85. The transparency phenomenon appears across gender and class lines, though its manifes-
tations may vary. Consider the last time a female sales clerk, secretary, or receptionist - some-
one you consider a functionary - behaved in a manner you found rude or discourteous. Did you 
attribute her behavior to race if she was black? If she was white? 
86. I experienced an example ofthis phenomenon recently. My life partner and I purchased 
a house together, but I went alone to provide the necessary information and documents for the 
loan application; the loan officer was the one who actually filled out the application form. A 
space was provided at the bottom of the form for the applicants' race. Without asking any race-
related questions about me or about my partner, whom he had never seen, the officer checked the 
designation "Caucasian" for each of us. 
One social scientist was so confident of the presumption of whiteness that he incorporated it 
in his study design. White students were asked to compare a series of job candidates' resumes; 
researchers found it unnecessary to identify the race of the candidates described by these stimu-
lus resumes. "Pilot testing had shown that white students in the subject population assumed that 
resumes without pictures described white [candidates]." John B. McConahay, Modem Racism 
and Modem Discrimination: The Effects of Race, Racial Attitudes, and Context on Simulated 
Hiring Decisions, 9 PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. BULL. 551, 553 (1983). 
87. Crayola changed the "Flesh" label to "Peach" in 1962. Judith Newmark, Solving Prob-
lem of Too Much Flesh, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 14, 1992, at D4. However, I don't 
mean by this story to lend credence to the "things are getting better" conception of race rela-
tions. Even without the "Flesh" designation, I think most children, even if nonwhite, still would 
choose the same or a similar crayon if asked to pick out a skin color. 
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white decisionmakers do not similarly misidentify as race-neutral per-
sonal characteristics, traits, and behaviors that are in fact closely asso-
ciated with whiteness. The ways in which transparency might infect 
white decisionmaking are many and varied. Consider the following 
story.ss 
A predominantly white Nominating Committee is considering the 
candidacy of a black woman for a seat on the majority white Board of 
Directors of a national public interest organization. The black candi-
date is the sole proprietor of a small business that supplies technical 
computer services to other businesses. She founded the company 
eleven years ago; it now grosses $700,000 annually and employs ten 
people in addition to the owner. The candidate's resume indicates that 
she dropped out of high school at sixteen. She later obtained a G.E.D. 
but did not attend college. She was able to open her business in part 
because of a state program designed to encourage the formation of 
minority business enterprises. 
The candidate's resume also reveals many years of participation at 
the local and state levels in a variety of civic and public interest orga-
nizations, including two that focus on the issues that are of central 
concern for the national organization that is now considering her. In 
fact, she came to the Committee's attention because she is considered a 
leader on those issues in her state. 
During the candidate's interview with the Nominating Committee, 
several white members question the candidate closely about the opera-
tion of her business. They seek detailed financial information that the 
candidate becomes increasingly reluctant to provide. Finally, the 
questioning turns to her educational background. "Why," one white 
committee member inquires, "didn't you go to college later, when you 
were financially able to do so?" "Will you be comfortable on a Board 
where everyone else has at least a college degree?" another asks. The 
candidate, perhaps somewhat defensively, responds that she is per-
fectly able to hold her own with college graduates; she deals with them 
every day in her line of work. In any event, she says, she does not see 
that her past educational history is as relevant to the position for 
which she is being considered as is her present ability to analyze the 
issues confronting the national organization. Why don't they ask her 
hypothetical policy questions of the sort the Board regularly addresses 
if they want to see what she can do? 
The interview concludes on a tense note. After some deliberation, 
88. This story is based on real events, but some changes have been made for the sake of my 
analysis. 
March 1993] Discriminatory Intent 975 
the Committee forwards the candidate's name to the full Board, but 
with strong reservations. "We found her to be quite hostile," the 
Committee reports. "She has a solid history of working on our issue, 
but she might be a disruptive presence at Board meetings. " 89 
At least three elements of the decisionmaking process in this story 
may have been influenced by the transparency phenomenon. We can 
examine the first of these only if we assume away the obvious possibil-
ity that the intense questioning about the candidate's business might 
reflect the white members' skepticism concerning this black woman's 
ability to establish and manage a successful, highly technical small 
business, which would be an example not of transparency but of stere-
otyping.90 With no such stereotyping at work, the white committee 
members would presumably question every Board candidate who 
owns a small business in exactly the same manner they queried the 
black woman. However, whites and blacks would not necessarily in-
terpret even that questioning in the same way. It's predictable that a 
black interviewee might take exception to that line of questioning be-
cause of the common white stereotype of blacks as not very intelligent; 
given that the candidate has no prior knowledge of her white inter-
viewers, she might reasonably at least wonder whether the questions 
arise from that stereotype, even if they in fact do not. A white candi-
date, on the other hand, would come to the interview without any 
history of being subjected to that particular stereotype, and so should 
be expected to respond to the line of questioning with greater equa-
nimity. 91 Transparency - here, the unconscious assumption that all 
interviewees will, or should, respond to a given line of questioning the 
way a white candidate (or the interviewers themselves) would respond 
- may account for the white questioners' inability to anticipate the 
larger meaning their queries might have for the nonwhite interviewee. 
89. I have been asked what the nonwhite members of the Nominating Committee had to say 
about these events, if there were any present. My response is that it does not matter, because the 
organization and the Nominating Committee were pursuing white-defined goals and applying 
white-formulated norms. See supra note 21. Assimilation to whites' standards and expectations 
is a powerful and attractive strategy for survival and success for many nonwhites. Whether or 
not one regards such choices as "free" given the conditions of white supremacy in which they are 
made, they are choices made under the shadow of white domination. Whites, therefore, should 
never assume that the participation or acquiescence of nonwhites in a decisionmaking process 
"neutralizes" the whiteness of the norms being applied. The crucial questions are who formu-
lated the norms in question and under what circumstances. 
90. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
91. Of course, some white candidates might be disadvantaged relative to others by their fail-
ure to conform to unarticulated class-related expectations. On the ways race and class intersect, 
see DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991); Ansley, supra note 14, at 1050-58; Calmore, supra note 15; 
Karl E. Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives 
from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REv. 157 (1982). 
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Second, the white committee members may be imposing white edu-
cational norms as well. Anyone smart enough to attend college surely 
would do so, they might assume. That assumption takes into account 
neither the realities of the inner city schools this woman attended, nor 
the personal and cultural influences that caused her to decide to drop 
out of high school, nor the ways the cost-benefit analysis of a college 
education might appear different to a black than to a white. This can-
didate's business success suggests that she made a rational and effec-
tive decision to develop her business rather than divide her energies 
between the business and school. Transparency may blind the white 
committee members to the whiteness of the educational norms they 
and their organization appear to take for granted. 92 
The most troubling and perhaps least obviously race-specific aspect 
of the story is the ultimate assessment of the black candidate as "hos-
tile." This seemingly neutral adjective is in fact race-specific in this 
context insofar as it rests on norms and expectations that are them-
selves race-specific. To characterize the candidate's responses as hos-
tile is to judge them inappropriate. Such a judgment presupposes an 
unstated norm of appropriate behavior in that setting, one that reflects 
white experience, priorities, and life strategies. The committee mem-
bers' expectations did not take into account some of the realities of 
black life in the United States that form part of the context in which 
the black candidate operates. The transparency of white experience 
and the norms that flow from it permitted the Nominating Committee 
to transmute the appropriate responses of the black candidate into a 
facially neutral assessment of "hostility."93 
At this point one may be tempted to conclude that what is needed 
is a more reliable technique for distinguishing genuinely race-neutral 
criteria of decision from those that only appear neutral. The above 
analyses of the white decisionmakers' failure to recognize white-spe-
cific norms might demonstrate only that they - and we - can do 
better. Perhaps we could use this and similar stories as points of de-
parture for an attempt to correct white misperceptions of white-spe-
cific criteria of decision. 
Three considerations, however, counsel against attempting to for-
92. I intend this not to be an affirmative action story; the black candidate's business experi-
ence made her at least as well qualified for the position she sought as would any white candidate's 
college education. The story is designed to illustrate the link between race and effective life 
strategies with respect to the acquisition of traditional resume credentials. 
93. I find the "hostility" assessment especially troubling because it effectively labels the black 
candidate as "Other" before she ever takes her seat on the Board of Directors; she is marginal-
ized from the very beginning. On the experience of marginalization, see BELL HOOKS, FEMINI5f 
THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984). 
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mulate a "rule" that would distinguish transparent from authentically 
race-neutral criteria of decision. First, the black nominee's story 
presents only rudimentary examples of transparently white norms. 
There are doubtless more complex and subtle stories of transparency 
to be told, for which the task of recognition and analysis would be 
significantly more difficult. At the same time, white decisionmakers 
make the relatively simple errors illustrated by this story quite fre-
quently, and some whites will resist or reject (or both) even the analy-
ses I have proffered. Whites as a group lack the experiential . 
foundation necessary even to begin to construct the analytic tools that 
would ground a comprehensive theory of transparency. 
Second, transparency probably attaches more to word usages than 
to the words themselves. For example, hostility may not have a race-
laden connotation in every instance in which a white decisionmaker 
employs it. The context of use - the combination of speaker, audi-
ence, decisionmaking process, and purpose -· more likely supplies the 
racial content of the term hostile as applied. Thus, a general analysis 
of transparency might have to be, paradoxically, situation specific, 
with a concomitant exponential increase in the difficulty of the theo-
retical project. 
Finally, the assumption that we can get better at identifying genu-
inely race-neutral decisionmaking presupposes that such a thing is 
possible. However, to repose any confidence in the concept of race 
neutrality is premature at best, because little supports it other than 
whites' subjective experience, itself subject to the transparency phe-
nomenon. The available empirical evidence points in the opposite di-
rection. Social scientists' work shows that race nearly always 
influences the outcomes of discretionary decisionmaking processes, in-
cluding those in which the decisionmaker relies on criteria thought to 
be race-neutral.94 There is, of course, no conclusive evidence that no 
instances of genuine race neutrality exist, but neither is there conclu-
sive evidence to the contrary. The pervasiveness of the transparency 
phenomenon militates against an unsupported faith by whites in the 
reality of race-neutral decisionmaking. 
I recommend instead that whites adopt a deliberate and thorough-
going skepticism regarding the race neutrality of facially neutral crite-
ria of decision. This stance has the potential to improve the 
distribution across races of goods and power that whites currently 
control. In addition, skepticism may help to foster the development of 
94. See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text. 
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a positive white racial identity that does not posit whites as superior to 
blacks. 
Operating from a presumption that facially neutral criteria of deci-
sion are in fact white-specific may prompt white decisionmakers to 
engage in the sort of analysis presented earlier, when they would not 
otherwise have done so. Heightened awareness of formerly over-
looked race specificity may, in turn, lead to the formulation of modi-
fied criteria of decision that are more attuned to, and more productive 
of, distributive racial justice. Had the white Nominating Committee 
members been aware of the race-specific dimensions of their questions 
concerning the candidate's business enterprise and educational back-
ground, they most likely would not have asked those questions. Per-
haps they would have gone so far as to adopt the course suggested by 
the candidate herself- to pose for her hypothetical policy issues, her 
responses to which likely would have been more revealing of the con-
tributions she would make as a black Board member. 
Even when he looks for it, however, the white decisionmaker may 
not always be able to uncover the hidden racial content of the criteria 
he employs. In those instances, the skeptical stance may function to 
promote distributive justice in two different ways. First, the skeptical 
decisionmaker may opt to temper his judgment with a simultaneous 
acknowledgment of his uncertainty concerning nonobvious racial 
specificity. Thus, in the Nominating Committee example, the deci-
sionmakers would have forwarded the nomination with a recommen-
dation something like the following: "We experienced this candidate 
as somewhat hostile, but we are not sure whether there is some racial 
element that we do not fully understand influencing our judgment." 
The impact of whiteness on the final decision may thus be mitigated 
even in the absence of a complete analysis of transparency. The black 
candidate is more likely to be accepted by the full Board on a recom-
mendation that does not unequivocally describe her as "hostile." 
Even assuming she winds up seated on the Board on either scenario, 
she certainly would be in a better position to have her views heard and 
fairly considered if she arrived without the unqualified label of hostil-
ity attached to her in advance.95 
Second, white decisionmakers might choose to develop pluralistic 
criteria of decision as a prophylactic against covert white specificity. 
95. While the question whether or not the black nominee will be seated on the Board of 
Directors clearly is a distributive matter, the "hostility" label is less obviously so. However, the 
marginalization that is likely to accompany the assessment of her as "hostile" renders the distri-
bution of power implicit in Board membership more illusory than real. In other words, labeling 
nonwhites as different reinforces existing white norms and thus precludes genuine racial redistri-
bution even when nonwhites gain nominal participation in institutions of power. 
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In this approach the Committee would allow the nominee to charac-
terize the qualifications, perspective, and experience she would bring 
to the Board if selected, with whatever emphasis she might choose to 
place on the fact that she would be a nonwhite member of a predomi-
nantly white group. The Committee would then report the candi-
date's assessment of her qualifications to the full Board and allow that 
policymaking body to decide whether the organization's ultimate goals 
might be furthered by the addition of this candidate.96 This strategy 
seeks to minimize the effect of transparently race-specific criteria of 
decision by substituting, whenever possible, criteria formulated by the 
nonwhite candidate for criteria constructed by the predominantly 
white Nominating Committee members. 
The skeptical stance may contribute to the development of a posi-
tive white racial identity by relativizing white norms. Even whites 
who do not harbor any conscious or unconscious belief in the superior-
ity of white people participate in the maintenance of white supremacy 
whenever we impose white norms without acknowledging their white-
ness. 97 Any serious effort to dismantle white supremacy must include 
measures to dilute the effect of whites' dominant status, which carries 
with it the power to define as well as to decide. Because the skeptical 
stance prevents the unthinking imposition of white norms, it encour-
ages white decisionmakers to consider adopting nonwhite ways of do-
ing business, so that the formerly unquestioned white-specific criterion 
of decision becomes just one option among many. The skeptical 
stance thus can be instrumental in the development of a relativized 
white race consciousness, in which the white decisionmaker is con-
scious of the whiteness and contingency of white norms. 
Most white people have no experience of a genuine cultural plural-
ism, one in which whites' perspectives, behavioral expectations, and 
values are not taken to be the standard from which all other cultural 
norms deviate. Whites therefore have no experiential basis for assess-
ing the benefits of participating in a pluralist society so defined. On 
the assumption that prevailing egalitarian mores preclude white 
supremacy as a justification for the maintenance of the status quo, 
adopting the skeptical stance in the interest of exploring cultural plu-
ralism seems the most appropriate course of action for any white per-
son who acknowledges the transparency phenomenon. 
96. I don't mean to suggest that passing along a difficult decision is a solution to trans-
parency; the Nominating Committee itself should make the relevant policy decision if that were 
the role assigned to it in the institutional structure. 
97. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. 
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III. A TRANSPARENCY-CONSCIOUS LooK AT THE 
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT RULE 
The threshold requirement that the constitutional plaintiff prove 
discriminatory intent operates to draw a sharp distinction between 
facially neutral but unconsciously race-specific instances of white deci-
sionmaking, on the one hand, and the deliberate use of race, whether 
overt or covert, on the other; only the latter is constitutionally imper-
missible. Relying on a distinction among discriminators' states of 
mind seems a curious strategy for implementing the principle that the 
use of race as a criterion of decision is what constitutes the constitu-
tional harm,98 because the racial criterion is equally present in either 
case. Indeed, the chosen rule appears more suited to drive the race 
specificity of white decisionmaking underground - out of whites' 
awareness - than to eradicate it altogether.99 However, the intent 
requirement might rest on either of two assumptions that, coupled 
with the perceived institutional costs of heightened scrutiny, provide 
ostensible justification for the decision to disapprove only the pur-
poseful use of race in government decisionmaking. These foundational 
assumptions are, first, that unconsciously race-specific decisionmaking 
is relatively rare, or, second, that the conscious use of race as a factor 
in decisionmaking is more blameworthy than its unconscious use. 100 
98. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(citizens' " 'personal rights' to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid 
rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decisionmaking"); 488 U.S. at 520 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that race discrimination is impermissible even as remedial 
measure). 
99. See Janet W. Schofield, Causes and Consequences of the Colorblind Perspective, in PRllJU· 
DICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 231, 248-50 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 
1986) (reporting that in integrated school with strong emphasis on colorblind norm, many teach· 
ers failed to use biracial or multicultural materials); Aleinikolf, supra note 5, at 1080 (arguing 
that strong colorblindness perpetuates existing white images of blacks); Lawrence, Unconscious 
Racism, supra note 15, at 335 (as overtly racist attitudes become culturally unacceptable, the 
individual must "repress or disguise racist ideas when they seek expression"). 
100. Throughout this Part I use the terms unconscious discrimination and unconscious race 
discrimination to mean the unconscious use of transparently white norms in decisionmaking. 
Thus, I am not focusing on the aspect of unconscious racism emphasized by Chuck Lawrence, 
which has more to do with unconscious hostility, stereotyping, or both. See Lawrence, Uncon· 
scious Racism, supra note 15, at 331-39; supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. However, 
there may be a connection between one form of stereotyping and the transparency phenomenon. 
Lawrence describes the "cultural stereotype" that assumes that blacks are fit only for certain 
roles in society (such as musician or athlete), but not others (such as doctor or lawyer). Such a 
stereotype can lead a decisionmaker - for instance, an employer - to ascribe to white candi-
dates attributes consistent with the cultural stereotype, but not do so with respect to black candi· 
dates, when the role in question is associated with whites. Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra 
note 15, at 343. I describe that process somewhat differently; I think it useful to recognize that 
the concepts associated with stereotypically white roles themselves come to bear a suppressed 
white connotation. Thus, for example, articulate comes to mean the manner of speaking associ-
ated with white professionals; collegial denotes the sort of relationship a white person would 
expect to have with a white colleague. Cf. id. at 343. 
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This Part examines the continued vitality of each of these founda-
tional beliefs once the transparency phenomenon is -accepted as de-
scriptive of white race consciousness. I argue that transparency, and 
. the skepticism it engenders regarding race neutrality, undermines each 
of these possible justifications for the Davis rule. The transparency 
phenomenon counsels skepticism regarding the perceived frequency of 
race-neutral decisionmaking in much the same way it does with re-
spect to specific examples of facially race-neutral criteria of decision. 
In addition, the social science literature provides further evidence that 
unconscious race-specific decisionmaking is in fact relatively common, 
and the potential impact of transparency upon the research itself · 
strengthens that conclusion. In regard to the relative blameworthiness 
of conscious and unconscious forms of race discrimination, trans-
parency reveals the undesirable normative consequences of the ex-
isting requirement of discriminatory intent, and it suggests that the 
concept of blameworthiness itself requires reexamination ill this con-
text. This Part concludes with a brief discussion of a theoretical alter-
native to the practice of blaming. 
A. The Belief in the Rarity of Unconscious Race Discrimination 
The Court's decision to adopt a discriminatory intent rule that 
does not reach unconscious race-specific decisionmaking might rest on 
a belief that such discrimination does not commonly occur. Such a 
belief is, perhaps, the natural corollary of whites' widespread faith in 
the pervasiveness of race-neutrality. This faith, for example, views 
Klan and other overtly white supremacist attitudes as extreme, per-
haps pathological, deviations from the norm of white racial thinking, 
as if those attitudes can be comprehended in complete isolation from 
the culture in which they are embedded.101 Similarly, whites tend to 
adopt the "things are getting better" story of race relations, which al-
lows us to suppose that our unfortunate his_tory of socially approved 
race discrimination is largely behind us. 102 This nexus of white confi-
dence in race neutrality might dictate that the law should treat the 
unconscious use of nonobviously race-specific criteria of decision as 
nothing more than the occasional deviation from the prevailing prac-
tice of race-neutral government decisionmaking. From this perspec-
tive, given that significant institutional costs are associated with 
judicial intervention, 103 unconscious race specificity seems too rare to 
101. Cf. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 181-
82 (1989) (contending that heterosexual intercourse is legitimated by distinguishing it from rape). 
102. See Delgado, Storytelling, supra note 15, at 2417. 
103. These institutional concerns are that any rule.that reaches beyond intentional discrimi-
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justify heightened review. 
The transparency phenomenon provides two arguments against 
the view that unconscious race specificity is uncommon. At mini-
mum, it counsels that we hesitate to acquiesce in any view that accepts 
race neutrality at face value, whether as a matter of fact or of fre-
quency of occurrence. Second, transparency supports the stronger, af-
firmative argument that unconscious race-specific decisionmaking is so 
common that it is in fact the norm for white decisionmakers. 
The belief that race-neutral decisionmaking is relatively common 
and unconsciously race-specific decisionmaking relatively uncommon 
stands analytically distinct from the belief that any particular instance 
of facially neutral decisionmaking is in fact what it seems. Even if the 
unconscious use of race were extremely rare, whites could still mis-
perceive the true character of every one of the few instances in which 
race in fact was a factor in the decision. Conversely, the fact that 
whites frequently are unaware of the white-specific factors that may be 
used in white decisionmaking does not dictate one conclusion or an-
other regarding the frequency with which such factors actually are 
employed. This analytic distinction notwithstanding, transparency 
counsels skepticism with respect to the frequency of race-neutral deci-
sionmaking as well. 
Because the transparency phenomenon creates a risk that whites 
will misapprehend the race-specific nature of apparently race-neutral 
decisionmaking, it simultaneously creates a risk that we will systemati-
cally underestimate the incidence of such decisionmaking. Each cir-
cumstance in which we fail to perceive accurately the racial content of 
our decisions contributes to the overall perception that race neutrality 
is the more common way of doing business. Thus, even though the 
conclusion that race specificity is the norm does not necessarily follow 
from transparency alone, we ought to adopt a healthy skepticism to-
ward, rather than a blind faith in the pervasiveness of, race neutrality 
if we wish to be able more accurately to assess the role of race in white 
decisionmaking.104 
nation would engage the courts in too much judicial review, and that it would involve them in a 
form of economic redistribution. Chuck Lawrence discusses the relation between the "too much 
intervention" difficulty and substantive constitutional principles in Lawrence, Unconscious Ra-
cism, supra note 15, at 381-86. In short, judicial review is always justified when there is a consti-
tutional value to be vindicated. On the problem of economic redistribution, see infra text 
accompanying notes 225-32. 
104. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ought not to rely on the perceived rarity of uncon-
scious discrimination as a justification for the requirement of discriminatory intent. The trans-
parency phenomenon suggests that if the Court desires to adopt the proposition that whites 
engage in race-neutral decisionmaking more often than not, it should do so only following a 
careful examination of the facts pertaining to the area of white decisionmaking under considera-
tion. Because no such discussion appears in any Supreme Court disparate impact decision, to the 
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Transparency also lends support to the stronger position that un-
conscious race-specific decisionmaking is so common that it is in fact 
the normal mode of white decisionmaking. This argument rests in 
part on an analysis of the outcomes of discretionary white decision-
making. Numerous studies indicate that whites receive more 
favorable treatment than blacks in virtually every area of social inter-
action.105 The weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that 
race affects whites' discretionary decisionmaking in areas as diverse as 
hiring and performance evaluations in employment settings;106 mort-
gage lending, insurance redlining, and retail bargaining; 107 psychiatric 
extent the Court has employed this line of reasoning at all it seems to have done so on the basis of 
an unexamined faith in race neutrality, one that is unjustified from the perspective of 
transparency. 
105. See, e.g., Jack Citrin et al., White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race 
Matter?, 54 PUB. OPINION Q. 74 (1990) ("[R]acial attitudes were a significant influence on the 
voting decisions of whites •••. "); Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. et al., The Racial Factor in Nonparti-
san Judicial Elections: A Research Note, 41 W. POL. Q. 807 (1988) ("[R]ace is important in 
judicial elections •.•. "). But see Jane A. Piliavin, Age, Race, and Sex Similarity to Candidates 
and Voting Preference, J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 351, 366 (1987) ("[A]geism is ... a far 
stronger effect than either racism or sexism."). 
106. See Nyla R. Branscombe & Eliot R. Smith, Gender and Racial Stereotypes in Impression 
Formation and Social Decision-Making Processes, 22 SEX ROLES 627, 645 (1990) ("Our results 
also suggest that stereotypes may have an impact by shaping the criteria used to reach decisions. 
With minority candidates, more confidence may be desired in order to make a decision, leading 
to solicitation of additional information."); William G. Doerner et al., An Analysis of Rater-Ratee 
Race and Sex Influences Upon Field Training Officer Program Evaluations, 11 J. CRIM. Jusr. 103 
(1989) (reporting ratee race effects observed in earlier phases of training program; later diminu-
tion of effects may be attributed to attrition); Kurt Kraiger & J. Kevin Ford, A Meta-Analysis of 
Ratee Race Effects in Performance Ratings, 10 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 56 (1985) (stating that race 
effects decline as percentage of blacks in workgroup increases); Kathcyn M. Neckerman & Joleen 
Kirschenman, Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias, and Inner-City Workers, 38 Soc. PROBS. 433, 445 
(1991) ("Our evidence suggests that negative preconceptions and strained race relations both 
hamper inner-city black workers in the labor market."); David A. Waldman & Bruce J. Avolio, 
Race Effects in Performance Evaluations: Controlling for Ability, Education, and Experience, 76 
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 897, 899 (1991) ("Results confirmed our prediction that race effects would 
be obtained for ratee race •... "). 
107. See Glenn B. Canner et al., Race, Default Risk and Mortgage Lending: A Study of the 
FHA and Conventional Loan Markets, 58 S. EcoN. J. 249, 251 (1991) ("[A]fter controlling for 
household and locational default risk, findings further suggest that minority households are 
somewhat less likely to obtain conventional financing than whites."); Gregory D. Squires & Wil-
liam Velez, Insurance Redlining and the Transformation of an Urban Metropolis, 23 URB. AFF. 
Q. 63, 63 (1987) ("In analyzing the distribution of homeowners insurance policies, a strong bias 
in favor of suburban and white neighborhoods and against inner-city and minority communities 
was found."). 
Though not precisely following social scientists' methods, Ian Ayres' study of retail car nego-
tiations illustrates both the effects of race and gender on everyday life and the difficulty of formu-
lating adequate legal remedies. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in ' 
Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 819 (1991) ("[W]hite males receive significantly 
better prices than blacks and women."). 
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diagnoses; 108 responses to patient violence in mental institutions;109 
and virtually every stage in the criminal law process: arrest, 110 the 
decision to charge, 111 imprisonment, 112 and capital sentencing. 113 
Studies of the impact of race on white decisionmaking nearly al-
ways explain disparate race effects by focusing on negative assessments 
of, or undesirable outcomes for, nonwhites, rather than positive results 
for whites. That is, they adopt a conceptual framework in which un-
conscious race discrimination tends to be associated with bias or stere-
otyping rather than transparency. At the same time, each of the 
studies cited above controls the data for race-neutral variables, so that 
the influence of race on the decisionmaking process can be assessed in 
isolation from other factors. The transparency phenomenon suggests 
that the selected independent variables may in fact be transparently 
white-specific. When they are, race effects, though different in kind 
from those conceptualized by the researchers, are present after all. 114 
108. See Harold W. Neighbors et al., The Influence of Racial Factors on Psychiatric Diagno-
sis: A Review and Suggestions for Research, 25 CoMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 301 (1989) 
(discussing two different and inconsistent assumptions underlying research on observed race dif-
ferences in psychiatric diagnosis). 
109. See Charles F. Bond, Jr. et al., Responses to Violence in a Psychiatric Setting: The Role 
of Patient's Race, 14 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 448 (1988) (reporting that white 
hospital staff restrained violent nonwhite patients four times as often as similarly violent whites). 
110. See Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity and Discretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on 
Police A"est Decisions, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234 (1984) (stating that police are more 
responsive to white victims of crime). 
111. See Cassia Spohn et al., The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the 
Decision to Reject or Dismiss Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175, 175 (1987) ("Hispanic males 
are most likely to be prosecuted fully, followed by black males, Anglo males, and females of all 
ethnic groups."). 
112. See George S. Bridges & Robert D. Crutchfield, Law, Social Standing and Racial Dis-
parities in Imprisonment, 66 Soc. FORCES 699, 699 (1988) ("Blacks are more likely than whites 
to be imprisoned in states where the black population is a small percentage of the total popula-
tion and predominantly urban."). 
113. Each of the following studies found significant racial disparities in capital sentencing; all 
found that imposition of the death penalty was more likely if the victim was white, and some also 
found it more likely if the offender was black: David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of 
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
661 (1983); Sheldon Ekland-Olson, Structured Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty: 
The First Decade After Furman in Texas, 69 Soc. Ser. Q. 853 (1988); Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro 
F. Vito, Race, Homicide Severity, and Application of the Death Penalty: A Consideration of the 
Barnett Scale, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 511 (1989) (Kentucky); M. Dwayne Smith, Patterns of Discrimi-
nation in Assessments of the Death Penalty: The Case of Louisiana, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. 279 (1987). 
Additional literature examining the effect of race on discretionary decisionmaking in the 
criminal process is collected and discussed in Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the 
White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611 (1985); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain 
a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal 
Law, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 1016 (1988). 
114. Researchers sometimes recognize the possible race-dependency of the variables they 
have posited as race-neutral. See, e.g., Canner et al., supra note 107, at 260 (reporting study 
results that borrower default risk as perceived by the lender has a significant effect on the type of 
loan obtained by borrower; also acknowledging that lender perceptions may be influenced by 
racial group data); Waldman & Avolio, supra note 106, at 901 (Racial disparities can be ex-
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In sum, the social science literature indicates that race impacts 
most white decisionmaking most of the time, and the researchers' own 
susceptibility to transparency suggests that unconscious discrimina-
tion may be even more prevalent than the studies acknowledge. It 
follows that faith in the commonality of race-neutral decisionmaking 
is a component of white race consciousness that lacks any solid empir-
ical support. 
B. The Belief that Conscious Discrimination ls More Blameworthy 
Than Unconscious Discrimination 
A second foundational belief that might be proffered to justify the 
line drawn by the discriminatory intent rule is that the conscious use 
of race-specific criteria of decision is more blameworthy than the un-
conscious use of race. That view is consistent with the familiar legal 
principle that conduct intended to 'Cause a specified harmful result is 
more blameworthy than conduct that causes the same harm inadver-
tently. In other words, the law commonly recognizes degrees of culpa-
bility associated with different states of mind. In the criminal law, for 
example, the Model Penal Code distinguishes, and ranks hierarchi-
cally, four kinds of culpability, based on acts done purposely, know-
ingly, recklessly, or negligently. 115 By analogy, if the harm of race 
discrimination lies in the use of race as a criterion of decision, the 
levels-of-culpability model would seem to suggest that the conscious 
or purposeful use of race as a criterion of decision should be deemed 
more blameworthy than the unconscious use of race. 
In the Washington v. Davis 116 opinion, the Court implicitly framed 
the issue as whether a showing of a racially disparate impact would 
trigger strict scrutiny or rational basis review. 117 Thus, adopting the 
rule that heightened scrutiny would require proof of discriminatory 
intent meant that government actions reflecting only unconscious race 
discrimination would enjoy the presumption of constitutionality asso-
ciated with rational basis review. To whatever extent the constitu-
tional rule is founded on, or is designed to reflect, a conception of 
plained as reflecting performance differences, but the latter "could potentially be traced to cultur-
ally biased predictive measures and qualitatively disparate life experiences."). 
115. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985). 
116. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
117. Very shortly after Davis was decided, the Court settled on an intermediate level of scru-
tiny for sex discrimination cases, a doctrinal development that had been in the works for some 
time. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine On a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. l, 34 
(1972). Therefore, the option of applying a similar standard of review in disparate impact cases 
should have been clearly in view. See Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, The Bakke 
Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 7, 24 (1979). 
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moral blameworthiness, the clear implication is that unconscious ra-
cism is not merely less blameworthy than its purposeful counterpart, 
but not blameworthy at all. 
Clearly, a legal rule is not dispositive of the moral status of the 
conduct it proscribes or permits. For example, the "no duty to res-
cue" rule receives nearly universal criticism for its failure to impose 
liability for conduct commonly thought to be morally blameworthy. 118 
On the other hand, legal rules do carry normative messages, more in-
sistently in some contexts than in others.119 We ought to take the nor-
mative dimension of the discriminatory intent rule quite seriously for 
at least two reasons. 
First, the Court itself has emphasized the normative dimension of 
its constitutional liability rules by increasingly crafting "state of mind" 
requirements reminiscent of the discourse of criminal liability. In ad-
dition to the Washington v. Davis rule itself, the Court has held that 
neither an Eighth Amendment nor a Due Process violation may be 
predicated on negligent conduct alone, 120 has formulated good faith 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule and to the constitutional guarantee 
of a criminal defendant's access to evidence, 121 and has fashioned a 
qualified immunity doctrine that partially insulates state and federal 
118. See, e.g .• W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 56 (5th ed. 1984) (commenting that the law's refusal to impose an obligation to go to the aid of 
another who is in danger is "revolting to any moral sense"). 
119. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the 
Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 28-30 (1986) (arguing that law can effect 
change in social beliefs and attitudes). 
120. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (holding that "the Due Process 
Clause is simply not implicated" by negligent deprivations of property or liberty); Davidson v. 
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976) ("deliberate 
indifference" a prerequisite for an Eighth Amendment violation). The Court has left open the 
possibility that "something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or 'gross negli-
gence,' is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 
n.3. 
121. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) ("[U]nless a criminal defendant can 
show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not 
constitute a denial of due process of law."); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massa-
chusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained in reasonable reliance 
on a search warrant subsequently determined to be invalid should not be excluded). 
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actors from section 1983122 and Bivens123 liability)24 Even though 
these requirements of intent or "bad faith" tend to be tested by objec-
tive standards, 125 and therefore are not literally mens rea require-
ments, the larger message is that there is a culpability element to 
(some) constitutional violations, which strengthens the analogy to 
criminal conduct. 
Second, whites share no apparent consensus concerning the moral-
ity of unconscious race discrimination. Indeed, the transparency phe-
nomenon suggests that no such consensus is attainable at present 
because unconscious discrimination that takes the form of transpar-
ently white-specific criteria of decision is by definition unseen by the 
white discriminator. Against this background, the manner in which 
the Court chooses to address unconscious discrimination inevitably 
will have a powerful normative effect, either to legitimate or to chal-
lenge accepted but unexamined white ways of thinking about race. 
The message that unconscious discrimination, if it exists, is not (very) 
blameworthy makes less likely that whites will cease to deny the exist-
ence of unconscious discrimination. 
In eschewing heightened scrutiny for racially disparate effects ab-
sent proof of discriminatory intent, the Court sends two messages that 
operate to legitimate unconscious race discrimination. First, the dis-
criminatory intent rule recreates transparency at the level of constitu-
tional doctrine, for. it affords a presumption of race neutrality to 
facially neutral criteria of decision without regard to the possibility 
that those criteria in fact reflect white-specific characteristics, atti-
tudes, or experiences. The rule tends to reassure whites that all is well 
so long as we avoid the conscious use of race-specific bases for 
122. Section 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress. 
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988). 
123. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971) (creating a cause of action analogous to § 1983 claims applicable to federal officials). 
124. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that immunity is to be 
granted unless federal official "violate[d] clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known"). Though the qualified immunity doctrine is not itself a 
constitutional rule, it affects de facto whether the individual will be held liable for a constitu-
tional violation. 
125. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 ("[T]he officer's reliance on [the warrant] must be objec-
tively reasonable."); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-17 (holding inquiry into subjective intent not 
administrable). 
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decision. 126 
The requirement of discriminatory intent also legitimates uncon-
scious race discrimination by reinforcing a popular white story about 
progress in race relations. The central theme of this story is that our 
society has an unfortunate history of race discrimination that is largely 
behind us. In the past, the story goes, some unenlightened individuals 
practiced slavery and other forms of overt oppression of black people, 
but the belief in the inferiority of blacks upon which these practices 
were premised has almost entirely disappeared today. We, aside from 
the exceptional few who remain out of step with the times, think of 
blacks as the equals of whites and thus no longer accept race as a 
permissible basis for different treatment.127 The Court's discrimina-
tory intent rule contributes to this dominant story insofar as it treats 
as blameworthy the form of race discrimination most common in the 
past but refuses to regard with suspicion the unconscious discrimina-
tion that is at least as significant a cause of the oppression of black 
people today.12s 
The undesirable normative consequences of a rule that treats con-
scious race discrimination as more blameworthy than unconscious dis-
crimination should not, however, raise the inference that the better 
approach would be to treat unconscious racism as equally blamewor-
thy as conscious discrimination. The more fruitful response, I suggest, 
is to question the practice of blaming itself. Blaming is not an effec-
tive, empirically well-founded, or prudent way of addressing the com-
plete range of contemporary manifestations of race discrimination. 
126. In fact, the reality may be even worse thanjust described. One study of modern racism 
confirmed the hypothesis that ambivalent whites are more likely to behave negatively toward 
blacks when nonracial values or beliefs can be invoked to explain the negative behavior than they 
are when no such explanation is readily available. See McConahay, supra note 86, at 552, 558. 
This might mean that the persistence of belief in race-neutral norms actually increases the inci-
dence of behavior by whites that disadvantages blacks. 
127. The shift in whites' racial attitudes, however, may be more apparent than real: whites 
express egalitarian mores that may reflect what is viewed as socially acceptable to a greater 
extent than what is actually believed. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Prejudice, 
Discrimination, and Racism: Histori~al Trends and Contemporary Approaches, in PREJUDICE, 
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 99, at I, 8-9 (stating that individuals tend to report 
themselves as less biased than they actually are); Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: 
The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 688-89 (1985) (arguing that 
whites comply with new antidiscrimination norms without internalizing them). 
128. The components of modem racism include: 
(1) rejection of gross stereotypes and blatant discrimination; (2) normative compliance with-
out internalization of new behavioral norms of racial acceptance; (3) emotional ambivalence 
toward black people .•. and a sense that blacks are currently violating traditional American 
values; (4) indirect "microagressions" against blacks which is [sic] expressed in avoidance of 
face-to-face interaction with blacks and opposition to racial change for ostensibly nonracial 
reasons; (5) a sense of subjective threat from racial change, and (6) individualistic concep-
tions of how opportunity and social stratification operate in American society. 
Pettigrew, supra note 127, at 687. 
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Blaming is an ineffective response to modem discrimination be-
cause recognition of the transparency phenomenon complicates the 
formulation of a coherent policy regarding the blameworthiness of dif-
ferent forms of race discrimination. In a simplified universe of only 
conscious and unconscious (i.e., transparent) discrimination, there are 
three plausible approaches to assigning blameworthiness: society 
might label conscious, but not unconscious, discrimination, blamewor-
thy; label both blameworthy; or label neither blameworthy. Brief re-
flection reveals that none of these approaches is likely effectively to 
address contemporary American forms of racial discrimination. 
The position implied by the discriminatory intent rule, that con-
scious discrimination is blameworthy but unconscious discrimination 
is not, is counterproductive of the ultimate goal of racial justice. In-
validating only conscious racism provides· an incentive for whites to 
repress and deny whatever racist attitudes they in fact harbor. As 
Chuck Lawrence has explained, psychoanalytic theory posits that in-
dividuals respond to conflicts between social norms that condemn ra-
cist attitudes and beliefs and their own racist ideas by excluding the 
latter from conscious recognition. 129 Thus, norms that label only con-
scious discrimination as blameworthy may be counterproductive, as 
they may operate primarily to perpetuate racist attitudes in a relatively 
intractable form. 130 
To hold both unconscious and conscious race discrimination 
equally blameworthy is also unlikely to produce desirable conse-
quences. First, blaming individuals for unconsciously held attitudes 
may produce paralyzing guilt when the racist character of those atti-
tudes comes to light. Furthermore, condemning the individual for 
matters not within his conscious control seems inconsistent with the 
very concept of blameworthiness. Finally, assessing blame for what, 
in effect, nearly every white person does seems equally incongruous. 
The final option is to regard both conscious and unconscious race 
discrimination as morally acceptable. There is merit in the proposi-
tion that race neutrality is at least an overblown norm; that race con-
sciousness may not be the overarching evil it often seems to be. But 
there should be no doubt about the moral status of the end to which 
race consciousness historically has been directed: white supremacy. 
To dismiss too easily the immorality of race-conscious decisionmak-
129. See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 15, at 335. 
130. In addition, as Kate Bartlett and Jean O'Barr have pointed out, focusing on the more 
blatant forms of discrimination may create a climate of backlash and denial: "I certainly am not 
a racist: I would not do these things." Katharine T. Bartlett & Jean O'Barr, The Chilly Climate 
on College Campuses: An Expansion of the ''Hate Speech" Debate, 1990 DUKE L.J. 574, 583. 
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ing, in a framework in which concepts of blame and innocence remain 
operative, would be to allow the inference that white domination of 
blacks is an acceptable social outcome. 
In addition to exposing the incoherence of policies that emerge 
when blaming is applied to race discrimination, the transparency phe-
nomenon casts doubt on a fundamental presupposition of that prac-
tice: that there exists a nonblameworthy alternative to the conduct for 
which blame is assessed. To say that either the conscious or uncon-
scious use of race-specific criteria of decision is blameworthy is to sup-
pose that some race-neutral alternative course of action might have 
been pursued instead.131 The lesson of transparency, however, is that 
in all likelihood race is always a factor influencing decisions that affect 
persons. To label one course of conduct blameworthy when there is 
no available "innocent" alternative seems simply unjust. 
Finally, the Court's use of the notions of blame, violation, and 
remedy is imprudent because the aura of criminality surrounding these 
concepts undoubtedly increases the Court's resistance to finding con-
stitutional violations that it might otherwise recognize. The Court un-
derstandably hesitates to suggest that another branch of government 
has engaged in criminal conduct.132 In a nonblaming framework, 
however, courts might become more effective participants in the effort 
to address and eradicate all forms of race discrimination from govern-
ment decisionmaking. 
The alternative to a discourse of blaming is a discourse of responsi-
131. Another effect of this aspect of blaming is to obscure whites' view of the structural 
components of contemporary racism. The alternatives are presented as conscious or unconscious 
race-specific decisionmaking, on the one hand, and race-neutral decisionmaking, on the other; no 
conceptual framework is evident for recognition of institutional or cultural racism, which are not 
amenable to the concept of blameworthiness. See Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The 
View from 1989, in THE PoLmcs OF LAW, supra note 15, at 121, 125. 
132. The Court's insitutional resistance to finding another branch of government guilty of 
discriminatory intent cannot alone explain the notoriously uneven outcomes in cases in which 
proving intent was the central issue. The fact that constitutional challengers have been signifi-
cantly more successful in jury selection, voting, and education cases than in employment and 
housing discrimination actions, compare Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opin-
ion); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 
(1973) with Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Haus. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) 
and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), suggests that the Court might be more willing to 
overcome this resistance when it deems the constitutional value at stake to be relatively uncon-
troversial. Daniel Ortiz has hypothesized that the flexibility of the intent requirement allows the 
Court to stand back, by requiring proof of actual discriminatory purpose, when the interests at 
stake are ones the prevailing ideology leaves to market allocation, while permitting judicial inter-
vention where the goods at issue - interests such as voting, jury participation, and education -
ought to be assured to all persons, at least at some minimal level. See Ortiz, supra note 51, at 
1140-41. This "fundamental interests" explanation of the application of the intent requirement 
illustrates the way process-theoretical difficulties may be overcome when a perceived consensus 
exists on a constitutional value commitment. See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 15, 
at 381-86. 
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bility. In this model, one takes responsibility for correcting undesir-
able states of affairs without thereby accepting either blame for, or 
even a causal connection with, the circumstance that requires 
correction: 
Notice first that to take responsibility for a state of affairs is not to 
claim responsibility for having caused it. So, for example, if I take re-
sponsibility for cleaning up the kitchen I am not thereby admitting to 
any role in creating the mess; the state of the kitchen may be the conse-
quence of actions quite independent of me .... 
In taking responsibility a woman chooses to make a commitment 
about a specific state of affairs.133 _ 
The kitchen example is apt for the dimension of fault as well as causa-
tion: even if I have had a hand in creating the mess in the kitchen, the 
blameworthiness vel non of my past conduct is not relevant to the 
commitment to change the existing state of affairs that taking respon-
sibility entails.134 
Any white decisionmaker can choose to take responsibility for the 
form of unconscious race discrimination transparency describes by 
adopting the skeptical stance with respect to facially race-neutral crite-
ria of decision she employs. Deliberate skepticism regarding race neu-
trality permits the decisionmaker to step outside the framework of 
blame and guilt that rarely offers more than a choice between legitima-
tion of the status quo and paralysis.135 For government deci-
sionmakers and the courts, deliberate skepticism provides an avenue 
for addressing unconscious discrimination while circumventing the 
problems of blaming described above. I will argue in Part IV that the 
Court can, and should, adopt a constitutional rule that requires gov-
ernment decisionmakers to take responsibility for unconscious race 
discrimination. 
IV. A REFORMIST PROPOSAL 
The white decisionmaker who takes responsibility for transparency 
has available a variety of measures that can ameliorate its effects. She 
can make explicit the whiteness of transparently white norms by label-
ing herself and her community's existing standards as white whenever 
133. JOYCE TREBlLCOT, TAKING REsPONSIBILITY FOR SEXUALITY 2 (1983). 
134. Though different in focus, this notion of responsibility intersects with Robin West's 
description of the concept of responsibility in Havelian liberalism. See Robin West, Foreword: 
Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990). To the extent that the existing dis-
criminatory intent rule legitimates unconscious discrimination, it undercuts whatever tendency 
whites might otherwise have to take responsibility for unconscious and structural racism. See 
supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. 
135. See Joan B. Karp, The Emotional Impact and A Model for Changing Racist Attitudes, in 
IMPACTS OF RACISM ON WHITE AMERICANS, supra note 73, at 87, 89. 
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possible. She can examine the goals her decisionmaking processes are 
designed to serve, to see whether they too are effectively white-specific 
and, if so, whether they can be reconceptualized in a more racially 
inclusive manner. She can deliberately select rules of decision that do 
not advantage whites; she can adopt culturally diverse strategies for 
accomplishing her purposes.136 Government decisionmakers too can 
and should take responsibility for race discrimination by confronting 
the transparency phenomenon. At bottom, they should do so for the 
same reason individual white people should: because it is the right 
thing to do. White people committed to fostering racial justice should 
expect no less of government - the body that exercises coercive power 
as the expression of a collective will that is in fact dominantly white -
than we do of ourselves. 
This Part sets forth a constitutional disparate impact rule designed 
to address the consequences of the transparency phenomenon as it af-
fects government decisionmaking.137 I recognize that not all govern-
ment actions that arguably violate the Equal Protection Clause are 
products of transparency, and I emphasize that this proposal does not 
foreclose finding some government decisions unconstitutional because 
motivated by racial animus. Other conduct might properly be invali-
dated because animated by racial stereotyping. Accordingly, the dis-
parate impact rule I propose would be only one piece in a complete 
equal protection jurisprudence. Borrowing the familiar doctrinal con-
cepts of heightened judicial scrutiny (from existing equal protection 
jurisprudence) and burdens of production and persuasion (from judi-
cial interpretations of Title VII), the rule aims to reach government 
decisions that carry racially disparate consequences and would likely 
not have been adopted but for the transparency phenomenon. 
In outline, the proposed rule calls for heightened scrutiny of gov-
ernmental criteria of decision that have racially disparate effects.138 
136. For reasons the transparency phenomenon should make obvious, these diverse strategies 
ideally should be initiated by nonwhites. However, relying on nonwhite input also has implica· 
tions for the ways whites can take responsibility for structural racism. See infra note 179. 
137. I don't mean to imply that I think the Supreme Court likely would move from the 
Washington v. Davis rule to this proposed rule at once. I do believe the proposal is adoptable, in 
the sense that it is consistent with Fourteenth Amendment principles and with what we know, on 
reflection, about the current forms of the problems it was designed to address. I hope that con· 
sideration of the contours of this transparency-conscious disparate impact rule will prompt fur-
ther discussion of a variety of ways equal protection doctrine might respond to modem racism. 
See Ansley, supra note 14, at 1062, for a discussion of the strategic and consciousness-raising 
value of doctrinal approaches to reform. 
138. Perhaps some government decisions rest on no articulable criteria of decision; if so, they 
lie beyond the scope of the rule proposed in this article. However, the rule is intended to reach 
any decision for which criteria can be articulated, even if government does not contemporane· 
ously set forth the factors supporting its action. Suppose, for example, government has reached a 
particular decision not on some principled basis, but purely as the consequence of political pres-
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The constitutional challenger bears the burden of persuasion on the 
question of the existence of racially disparate effects. Once disparate 
impact is proven, the burden of production shifts to government to 
articulate the purposes behind the challenged rule of decision. The 
reviewing court ought to interpret government's purpose(s) in as plu-
ralist a manner as possible, but government has the option of resisting 
that interpretation in favor of an assimilationist construction of its 
goals. In that event, government will bear a burden of justification 
similar to that imposed under traditional intermediate scrutiny. Fi-
nally, whether governmental purposes are construed pluralistically or 
in an assimilationist manner, the constitutional challenger has the ob-
ligation to produce alternative means of achieving government's goals. 
Government must implement the challenger's proposals unless it can 
demonstrate that those alternatives provide less effective means of im-
plementing its goals than the criteria of decision originally 
employed.139 
Section IV.A explicates the rule in greater detail. The remainder 
of this Part addresses two possible criticisms of the proposed rule: 
that the rule abandons the colorblindness principle and that it would 
engage the courts too deeply in economic redistribution. I argue that 
neither criticism is persuasive. First, colorblindness is not a satisfac-
tory constitutional principle; second, the racially redistributive effects 
of the proposed rule would be both moderate and appropriate. 
A. A Reformist Disparate Impact Rule 
The thoroughly skeptical white decisionmaker regards all facially 
neutral criteria of decision as presumptively white-specific; the exist-
ence of racially disparate effects only confirms what his skepticism al-
ready counsels. Thus, the individual decisionmaker who takes 
transparency seriously has no need for a rule that treats facially neu-
tral criteria of decision with racially disparate effects differently from 
facially neutral criteria in general. However, that stance is unwork-
able as a constitutional rule because it would require heightened judi-
cial scrutiny of virtually every governmental decision. A rule that 
sure. Ordinarily, persons disadvantaged by the policy can request, and expect to receive, an ac-
counting of the criteria upon which the decision was (or rationally could have been) based. If no 
such explanation is possible, then the decision lies outside the scope of the proposed rule (though 
it likely would be unsupportable politically and might well fail constitutional rational basis re-
view as well). If, as generally will be the case, government is able to articulate reasons for its 
action, these criteria of decision become the focus of the constitutional analysis described by the 
proposed rule. 
139. Transparently white norms coerce assimilation under the guise of neutrality. As indi-
cated in the text, the rule attempts to combat the assimilationist effects of transparency at both 
the purpose and means stages of analysis. 
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requires a showing of disparate effects as a predicate for heightened 
scrutiny is a satisfactory alternative because it provides for judicial in-
tervention whenever the presumed transparency phenomenon has pro-
duced concrete racial consequences.140 
Because it is the issue that triggers heightened scrutiny, the consti-
tutional challenger must have the burden of persuasion on the exist-
ence of racially disproportionate effects. 141 However, the history of 
Title VII disparate impact litigation reveals a potential hazard. When 
courts have interpreted Title VII to place a heavy burden of persua-
sion on the defense on the issue of business necessity, defendants have 
attempted to avoid facing that burden by disputing plaintifrs proof of 
adverse impact.142 The ensuing evidentiary warfare has been intense 
and highly technical.143 The Washington v. Davis rule provides no 
similar incentive for constitutional defendants to search out ways to 
contest plaintiffs' factual claims of disparate effects, because plaintiffs 
140. Some may argue that the institutional concerns associated with judicial review - per-
haps the countermajoritarian difficulty in particular - counsel further limitations on the scope 
of the proposed rule. However, the nature of the transparency phenomenon cuts in the opposite 
direction: the skepticism it engenders favors more, rather than less, review. Furthermore, even 
the processual approach to the problem of judicial review sees it as justified when there is a clear 
constitutional value to be vindicated. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitu-
tionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitu-
tion •... "). From this perspective, transparency-conscious judicial review is justified as an 
expression of a widely shared norm prohibiting race-specific government decisionmaking. 
Preoccupation with the institutional problem of judicial review can be debilitating. As Chuck 
Lawrence has put it, "[T]o give judicial economy priority over the recognition of constitutional 
injury seems wrong. It is to make a value choice that is no different from the decision to deny 
that injury recognition altogether." Lawrence, Unconscious Racism, supra note 15, at 384. Tak-
ing transparency seriously mandates overcoming one's initial resistance to expanded judicial re· 
view in disparate impact cases. 
141. I borrow the concepts of burden of production and burden of persuasion from Title VII; 
they are defined supra note 46. The basic outline of the Title VII disparate impact analysis is set 
forth supra text accompanying notes 46-49. 
142. Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 1329-31. For a history of the business necessity doctrine, 
see Pamela L. Perry, Balancing Equal Employment Opportunities with Employers' Legitimate 
Discretion: The Business Necessity Response to Disparate Impact Discrimination Under Title Vil 
12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1990). The Supreme Court placed the burden of persuasion on the 
question of business necessity on the plaintiff in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 
642, 659 (1989), but was overruled by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991: 
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this title 
only if (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment 
practice that causes a disparate impact ..• and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity ..•. 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105, 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1992). 
143. See, e.g., DAVID c. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OP DISCRlMI· 
NATION (1980); STATISTICAL METHODS JN DISCRIMINATION LmGATION 69-209 (David H. 
Kaye & Mikel Aickin eds., 1986). Fc;>r a (mostly) nonstatistical but critical examination of one 
form of job testing, see Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Test-
ing. 104 HARV. L. REv. 1157 (1991) (exposing theoretical difficulties underlying testing debates). 
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already bear the burden of proof of discriminatory intent.144 How-
ever, given a rule that mandates heightened scrutiny upon proof of 
disproportionate effects alone, the potential for similar litigation strat-
egies is evident. 
Accordingly, the proposed rule anticipates the need for evidentiary 
guidelines concerning proof of adverse effects, and it permits the con-
stitutional challenger to make such a demonstration by relying on a 
statistical disparity between the racial composition of the group se-
lected by the challenged criteria of decision and that of the general 
population.145 This approach differs from that adopted by the 
144. As a practical matter, proof of discriminatory intent will be dispositive of disparate 
impact claims under Davis. In theory, proving intent only triggers strict scrutiny, so that it 
remains possible for government to defend the challenged practice as necessary to serve a com-
pelling state purpose. On reflection, however, it's evident that once plaintiff has met the intent 
requirement, by showing that a facially neutral practice had been adopted "because of" its ra-
cially discriminatory effects, government would hardly be in a position to put forward a compel-
ling justification for the practice. Thus the intent inquiry operates as the sole occasion for the 
court's examination of governmental purpose, but the examination is conducted with the burden 
almost entirely on the constitutional challenger. For a hypothesis concerning the instances in 
which the challenger's "burden of proor• on the issue of intent appears relatively lighter, see 
Ortiz, supra note 51, at 1140-41. 
145. Other issues related to proof of adverse effects likely would become as hotly contested as 
they have been in the Title VII arena. These include the level of statistical significance necessary 
to establish a disparity, the question whether plaintiff must establish a causal connection between 
a demonstrated disparity and each of a group of challenged practices, and what is known as the 
bottom-line defense: whether employer may defend a practice known to have an adverse effect 
by showing that the outcome of its decisionmaking process, taken as a whole, is not racially 
disproportionate. 
On the question of statistical significance, the proposed rule assumes an approach similar to 
that employed in Title VII cases. See sources cited supra note 143. However, the rule also 
assumes that resolution of this issue should always lean in plaintiff's direction, on the ground that 
transparency consciousness is better served by more, rather than less, review. For the same 
reason, the proposed rule would not require plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged prac-
tice causes a disparate effect. In general, the causation problem will take on a somewhate differ-
ent form under the proposed rule. See infra note 152. For a discussion of the arguments on each 
side of the Title VII question, see Robert Belton, Causation In Employment Discrimination, 34 
WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1291-93 (1988); Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrim-
ination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 560-64 (1991). 
The bottom-line defense, in which the employer defends a criterion of decision that in isola-
tion produces racially disproportionate effects by pointing to a racially balanced "bottom line" 
outcome of the decisionmaking process taken as a whole, presents a more difficult question for 
transparency-conscious review. In the Title VII context, the bottom-line problem has been de-
scribed as a choice between implementing equality by providing employers an incentive to engage 
in affirmative action, or by encouraging the use of validated employment criteria. See Martha 
Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the 
Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983). Though my proposed rule 
does not necessarily disapprove explicitly race-conscious action, see infra note 182, and so would 
not reject the bottom-line defense for that reason, the interest in fostering cultural pluralism 
ultimately counsels scrutiny of any component of a decisionmaking process that can be shown to 
have a racially disparate effect. Assuming such an effect were the product of a transparently 
white-specific criterion of decision, the later affirmative measures could benefit only those appli-
cants who had already satisfied the prior white-specific requirement. The racially balanced bot-
tom line would not necessarily represent cultural diversity. Therefore, the proposed rule does 
not accept the bottom-line defense. 
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Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 146 a Title VII 
case in which the Court held that plaintiffs must demonstrate adverse 
impact on the basis of a comparison between the racial composition of 
the workforce occupying at-issue jobs and that of the "qualified . . . 
population in the relevant labor market/'147 The difference in tech-
niques of proof reflects the distinction between blame and responsibil-
ity. The Supreme Court insisted on the comparatively restrictive labor 
market approach in part to insulate the employer from liability associ-
ated with racial disparities that are not the employer's "fault."148 This 
conception of fault, though laden with causal connotations, clearly im-
plicates notions of blameworthiness as well. 149 On the other hand, a 
rule designed to require government to take responsibility for racial 
justice regardless of who or what caused a given disparity would afford 
the constitutional challenger greater latitude on the question of the 
existence of disparate effects. 
Of course, other methods for demonstrating disparate effects are 
less restrictive than the labor market approach but less expansive than 
the general population comparison.150 An intermediate approach ar-
guably might be warranted in the interest of moderating government's 
burden of justification or in order to regulate access to judicial review, 
but the rule proposed here declines to address those concerns by in-
creasing the difficulty of plaintiff's "prima facie case." As I will ex-
plain below, government's burden under this proposal would be 
considerably less than that of compelling justification.151 The fact that 
146. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
147. 490 U.S. at 650 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 
(1977)). The Wards Cove plaintiffs had relied on a comparison between the racial composition of 
the components of the workforce occupying relatively skilled and nonskilled positions. For a 
discussion of other, more common alternatives to the labor market comparison, see infra note 
150. 
148. 490 U.S. at 651-52 & n.7 ("If the absence of minorities holding such skilled positions is 
due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants (for reasons that are not [the employer's) fault), 
[employer's] selection methods or employment practices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate 
impact' on nonwhitesL]" but the analysis would be different if employer's actions had deterred 
nonwhites from applying for those positions.). 
149. On the normative dimension of legal attributions of causation, see H.L.A. HART & 
TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 62-68 (2d ed. 1985). 
150. Factors that plaintiffs might use to refine the pool against which they compare the racial 
composition of a group selected through challenged criteria of decision include geographical and 
time limitations, relevant skills and qualifications, and the use of census versus applicant-flow 
data. For a discussion of the alternative methods of proving disparate impact, and their relative 
merits, see Elaine Shoben, Defining the Relevant Population in Employment Discrimination Cases, 
in STATISTICAL METHODS IN DISCRIMINATION LmGATION, supra note 143, at SS; Elaine w. 
Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Im-
pact Analysis Under Title VIL 56 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 6-19 (1977) (comparing general population, 
applicant flow, community composition, and relevant labor market approaches). 
151. See infra text accompanying note 166. 
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a challenged criterion of decision could be shown to have racially dis-
parate effects merely by comparing those with the racial composition 
of the general population is a desirable feature of the proposed rule. 
Mandating heightened scrutiny in more, rather than fewer, cases plau-
sibly characterized as exhibiting disparate effects is consistent with the 
skepticism regarding race neutrality that consciousness of the trans-
parency phenomenon impels: If we are to ferret out transparently 
white-specific criteria of decision, government should bear the task of 
justification more rather than less frequently. 
Once challenger has proved the existence of racially disparate ef-
fects, 152 government should have to articulate the purpose or goal the 
challenged criteria are designed to accomplish. Initially this is simply 
a burden of production, so that challenger need not guess at govern-
ment's policies or purposes. However, transparency can infect govern-
ment's purposes as readily as it can affect chosen means, so the 
interpretation of government's articulated purpose is critical. 
Heightened, transparency-conscious scrutiny of governmental pur-
poses requires the reviewing court to construe those purposes in a 
manner that does not perpetuate the covert imposition of white norms. 
One way to avoid the reintroduction of transparency is for courts to 
interpret government's goals in as culturally pluralist a manner as pos-
sible. That is, the reviewing court should inquire whether and to what 
extent government's articulated goal, viewed at an appropriate level of 
generality, may be construed to encompass objectives that need not be 
understood as white-specific. For example, in Fragante v. City & 
County of Honolulu 153 a Filipino job applicant who achieved the high-
est score on the applicable civil service examination was rejected for a 
position as a clerk at the Department of Motor Vehicles because he 
spoke English with a heavy Filipino accent. Had the case been liti-
152. In Title VII disparate impact cases the plaintiff has to "isolat[e] and identifiy] the spe-
cific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities." 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)). The proposed consti-
tutional disparate impact rule does not impose the same difficulty upon plaintiffs because it re-
quires government to articulate its criteria of decision. The challenger still bears the burden of 
persuasion on causation but, for the purpose of proving disparate effects, may tailor its identifica-
tion of relevant populations to the particular decisional criteria articulated by the government. 
153. 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989). Another case that poses an interesting problem in mul-
ticulturalism, transparently white norms, and facially neutral but covertly race-dependent norms 
is Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), which upheld the right of an 
employer to prohibit the wearing of braided hairstyles on the job. Both the criterion of decision 
- no braided hair - and the asserted purpose - projecting a "conservative, business-like im-
age" - were transparently white. Interestingly, at one point the court analogized the issue to a 
prohibition against speaking languages other than English in the workplace. See Rogers, 527 F. 
Supp. at 232; infra note 177. For an illuminating analysis of Rogers, see Paulette M. Caldwell, A 
Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365. 
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gated as a constitutional challenge to a facially neutral rule requiring 
clerks to speak "unaccented" English, the goverµment most likely 
would have identified effective communication with the public as the 
purpose behind the rule.154 
The transparency of the norm of "unaccented" speech should be 
obvious. Fragante's speech was perceived as "difficult" by individuals 
who, consciously or unconsciously, preferred the speech of people 
with accents more nearly like that of white Americans. 155 This case 
also illustrates the temptation for government to attempt to justify a 
transparently white criterion of decision with an equally white-specific 
purpose. From that perspective, the central problem of the case is the 
suppressed whiteness of the notion of "effective communication" with 
the public, government's proffered "legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason."156 
Under the disparate impact analysis proposed here, a reviewing 
court ought to construe government's purpose, if possible, in a manner 
that would not advantage whites. That is, the court would have to 
presume the "public" to be a diverse community and give "effective 
communication" the broadest possible reading. If the court uncon-
sciously interpreted "effective communication" to mean "effective 
communication with whites," it would have reintroduced trans-
parency in a manner that would defeat the underlying goals of height-
ened scrutiny. 
On the other hand, government ought to have the option of insist-
154. In fact, Mr. Fragante's was a Title VII case, analyzed by the court of appeals ns a 
disparate treatment claim. That analysis first requires plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination based on a prohibited characteristic - here, national origin. The court appar· 
ently accepted the proposition that accent discrimination is national origin discrimination and 
assumed, without deciding, that Fragante had satisfied the requirements of a prima facie case of 
disparate treatment set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Fra-
gante, 888 F.2d at 595-96. The burden then shifts to defendant to articulate a "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason" for the adverse decision. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The Department of Motor Vehicles' reason for not selecting Fragante 
was that his speech was "difficult to understand." Fragante, 888 F.2d at 597-98. The court 
described this as Fragante's "inability to communicate effectively with the public.'' 888 F.2d at 
598. Finally, plaintiff must demonstrate that employer's proffered reason is in fact a pretext for 
discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. Mr. Fragante was unable to prove discriminatory in-
tent. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 598. The case probably would not have been resolved differently on a 
traditional Title VII disparate impact analysis, because the court made clear its view that "de-
fendants were motivated exclusively by reasonable business necessity.'' 888 F.2d at 598. 
155. See Matsuda, Accent Discrimination, supra note 15, at 1361 & n.121. 
156. Not only would at least some nonwhite listeners, namely Filipino speakers of English, 
have no difficulty at all with Fragante's speech, there is the additional troubling testimony of a 
linguist that some persons' difficulty in understanding him could be attributed to prejudice 
against the particular accent he had; any nonprejudiced individual would have no such difficulty. 
Id. at 1337-38. Thus, the nonobvious whiteness of government's purpose in this case might owe 
in part to white bias in addition to the unthinking imposition of white norms. Whites do not 
expect to have to learn to understand "low status" speech. Id. at 1351-52. 
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ing on a construction of its purpose that is white-specific, when it has 
good reasons for doing so. On occasion, context may provide a good 
reason: if, for example, all or nearly all of the persons with whom Mr. 
Fragante would come into contact were in fact white, government 
should be permitted to seek "effective communication" with that 
group, even if its purpose is thus effectively white-specific.157 How-
ever, a rule of general applicability would require a more thorough 
evaluation of government's goals. Suppose government argued that 
"effective communication" should be construed in a white-specific 
manner for the sake of uniformity and that a white norm had been 
adopted because whites are the dominant group in this society.158 At 
this stage the reviewing court would revert to a more traditional form 
of scrutiny, balancing government's interest in uniformity and white-
ness against the burden the adoption of a white-specific rule would 
place on nonwhites. To prevail under this "mid-level" scrutiny, gov-
ernment's chosen purpose must be "important."159 At minimum, an 
asserted interest in administrative convenience would not be 
sufficient.160 
Once the question of purpose has been settled, whether in an as-
similationist or a pluralist manner, the burden of production shifts to 
the challenger161 to introduce means of achieving that purpose that do 
not disproportionately disadvantage nonwhites.162 In the Fragante sit-
157. However, government clearly couid not have made this case on the actual facts of Fra-
gante. The Department of Motor Vehicles position in question required contact with a very 
diverse public. See id. at 1335. 
158. I hypothesize that government might adopt this rationale because I see the need for 
uniformity or standardization as government's best case for assimilationism. Similarly, I think 
that as a general rule the selection of white norms is best defended, if at all, on the basis of whites' 
numerical dominance, though the government may well be able to defend the substance of some 
white-associated norm independently of its whiteness in specific instances. I am not suggesting, 
however, that I think government ought to be able successfully to defend an assimilationist pur-
pose with respect to accents in many circumstances. 
159. This is the same standard required in sex discrimination cases. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In the context of a rule of general applicability, government's interest in 
standardizing accents would not satisfy this test, because the purpose lacks an.adequate factual 
foundation: accent uniformity is unattainable. See Matsuda, Accent Discrimination, supra note 
15, at 1395-96. Furthermore, one's accent is relatively fixed, though the argument from immuta-
bility is dangerous. Id. at 1400. 
160. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (plurality·opinion). 
161. Other nonwhite individuals or groups who are adversely affected by the existing deci-
sion criteria, or who expect to be disproportionately impacted by the proposed selection criteria, 
should be entitled to intervene. The court, exercising its equitable powers, would ultimately 
choose among all criteria proposed by plaintiffs and intervenors that would adequately satisfy 
government's legitimate objectives. See infra text accompanying notes 164-65. 
162. A final comparison with Title VII doctrine is in order here. Early on, the Supreme 
Court said that even if the employer demonstrated that the criteria at issue were job related, the 
disparate impact plaintiff could still show that other criteria of selection, without similar racially 
disparate effects, would equally serve the employer's interest. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). Though the Court envisioned the introduction of alternative 
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uation the challenger might propose one or more functional tests for 
"effective communication with the public" that would measure, for 
example, the actual ability of the relevant set of listeners to compre-
hend Mr. Fragante's speech.163 The challenger should be allowed at 
this stage to propose measures that would operate to the advantage of 
nonwhite applicants, as well as criteria of selection that would be ra-
cially neutral in effect.164 
Finally, government has the burden of persuasion on the question 
of means. Government must show that challenger's proposed alterna-
tive(s) will be less effective in achieving its purpose, as interpreted by 
the court, than the criteria of decision employed by the government. 
If government fails to carry its burden here, it will be required to em-
ploy challenger's criteria of decision either as a substitute for, or in 
parallel with, the criteria previously in use.165 In the abstract, parallel 
use of alternative criteria of decision would be preferable in cases in 
which challenger's proposed criteria of selection operate to advantage 
means as a method of proving discriminatory intent, see 422 U.S. at 425; commentators have 
argued that alternatives evidence has other valuable uses. Julia Lamber has made the case that 
proving less discriminatory alternatives can shed light on the employer's reasons for using chal· 
lenged job criteria, and on the strength of the relation between those reasons and the selected 
criteria, as well as bearing on intent should plaintiff pursue a disparate treatment claim at the 
same time. Julia Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria: The Signifi· 
cance of Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases Under Title VI/, 1985 Wis. L. REV. l. 
Because the rule proposed here emphasizes transparency-conscious forms of purpose and 
means review, however, the reason for requiring the constitutional challenger to introduce alter· 
native means is somewhat different. This requirement is designed to mitigate the burden imposed 
on government by a rule that mandates heightened scrutiny in all disparate impact cases. See 
infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
163. The "relevant set" of listeners would be determined by the court's construction of the 
governmental purpose. An assimilationist interpretation would define the relevant group as be· 
ing completely or essentially white; a pluralist interpretation would envision a more diverse audi· 
ence. In either case, the challenger would have the opportunity to propose alternative criteria of 
selection that would effectuate government's goal. 
Being clear about the relevant set of listeners is also a critical element of Mari Matsuda's 
proposed analysis of accent discrimination under Title VII. See Matsuda, Accent Discrimination, 
supra note 15, at 1374. 
Mr. Fragante almost certainly would have prevailed had his speech been assessed under a 
functional test of intelligibility. Matsuda has pointed out the central irony of the actual case: no 
one in the courtroom experienced any apparent difficulty understanding Fragante's speech. Id. 
at 1338 & n.28. She also discusses issues of comprehensibility. Id. at 1373-79. 
164. One example of an alternative that would advantage nonwhites is provided infra text 
accompanying note 177. 
165. The parallel use of distinct criteria of decision should be distinguished from their serial 
use, or stacking. The latter refers to a sequential or combined set of discrete requirements, as 
would occur, for example, if applicants were required to possess a high school diploma and to 
achieve a specified minimum score on "Test 21." An example of parallel use would be a require· 
ment that applicants have either a diploma or a minimum score on the test. In some circum· 
stances, the parallel use of challenger's criterion could be implemented by combining it with the 
formerly employed selection device. For example, were challenger to propose a second test to be 
used in parallel with Test 21, the two could be administered as a single instrument and an appro· 
priate minimum score selected. 
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nonwhites, and substitution would be appropriate if the proffered al-
ternative had racially neutral effects. For example, in the Fragante 
scenario, a functional, actual-ability-to-be-understood test would not 
systematically advantage nonwhites over whites, and so substitution of 
that test for the hypothesized requirement of "unaccented" speech 
would be preferable. 
Like the traditional forms of heightened scrutiny employed in 
equal protection analysis, the disparate impact rule proposed here 
places increased burdens of justification on government with respect 
both to its purposes and its means, but the rule does so with special 
attention to the transparency phenomenon. Thus, where traditional 
heightened review requires that government's purpose be unusually 
weighty (and, arguably, that it be contemporaneous with the chal-
lenged rule or decision and adequately supported in fact166), trans-
parency-conscious scrutiny requires government to articulate purposes 
that are neither overtly nor transparently white-specific. Government 
may impose norms that are effectively white, but it must announce its 
choice candidly, and it must bear a substantial burden of justification 
when it wishes to do so. Traditional heightened scrutiny then de-
mands a sufficiently tight "fit" between government's goal and its cho-
sen means; the proposed rule requires the use of alternative criteria of 
decision that have no racially disparate impact whenever doing so will 
not negatively affect government's permissible purposes. 
The Washington v. Davis167 facts provide another, more challeng-
ing application of the proposed rule. 168 In that case the challenged 
criterion of decision was "Test 21," a written test of "verbal ability, 
vocabulary, reading and comprehension." Test 21 had an undisputed 
disparate racial impact: black applicants failed it at four times the rate 
166. See Gunther, supra note 117, at 33. 
167. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
168. The Davis facts are analyzed here as raising a problem of dialect, while Fragante con-
cerned accent discrimination. A dialect is a variant of a language; accent refers to manner of 
pronunciation. One can speak any dialect in a variety of accents. In particular, the dialect 
known as standard English can be spoken with a Filipino accent, an African-American accent, or 
the accent known as "General American." See William R. Van Riper, General American: An 
Ambiguity, in DIALECT AND LANGUAGE v ARIATION 123 (Harold B. Allen & Michael D. Linn 
eds., 1986). 
The analysis that follows assumes, for the sake of discussion, that at least some of the unsuc-
cessful Davis applicants were more proficient in the dialect known as Black English than in 
"standard" (White) English. In this respect, I depart from the more common hypothesis that the 
difficulties experienced by the actual Davis plaintiffs had been the result of inferior, segregated 
education. Black English is a fully developed language, and is described in J.L. DILLARD, 
BLACK ENGLISH: ITS HISrORY AND USAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1972); GENEVA 
SMITHERMAN, TALKIN AND TEsr!FYIN: THE LANGUAGE OF BLACK AMERICA (1977). 
My intuition is that there is a difference between accent and dialect here: whites are more 
willing to tolerate and accommodate (some) accent pluralism than we are dialect variation. 
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of white applicants. 169 Government's articulated purpose was "mod-
estly to upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees ... par-
ticularly where the job requires special ability to communicate orally 
and in writing."170 
At the stage of purpose analysis, the reviewing court would begin 
with the presumption that government had not set out to foster in all 
its police officers only the "communicative abilities" of white persons, 
though government could, if it wished, make the case that that was 
precisely what it had intended.171 The underlying agenda of this sort 
of purpose review is to require government to clarify its goals, and 
concomitantly to expose transparently white-specific governmental 
purposes. If government was seeking officer-candidates able to com-
municate effectively with a diverse - in Washington, D.C., a majority 
black - public, a pluralist interpretation of its purpose would be most 
appropriate. 172 On the other hand, if government was pursuing a de-
gree of language standardization, say with the intent to 
"professionalize" the police department, it would be evident that 
"professionalization" had been implicitly defined by reference to white 
norms, and so further justification of that goal, and of the white lan-
guage standard it incorporates, would be in order. 173 
Judge Robb, who dissented from the court of appeals decision that 
held Test 21 unconstitutional, articulated government's best case for 
language standardization: 
[M]odem law enforcement is a highly skilled professional service. In 
school and thereafter in practice a policeman must learn and understand 
169. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
170. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 246. 
171. The goal of this presumption against assimilationist interpretations of governmental 
purposes is to implement the attitude of radical skepticism concerning race neutrality at all levels 
of governmental decisionmaking, including judicial review. 
172. Some police professionals have recognized the potential value of a diverse police force. 
See, e.g., Terry Eisenberg & James M. Murray, Selection, in POLICE PERSONNEL ADMINISTRA· 
TION 69-70 (0. Glenn Stahl & Richard A. Staufenberger eds., 1974). 
173. Historically, education has been the centerpiece of the movement to professionalize the 
police. George D. Eastman & James A. McCain, Education, Professionalism, and Law Enforce-
ment in Historical Perspective, 9 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 119 (1981). Differing views exist 
regarding the relation between higher education and police work. Compare, e.g., Daniel J. Bell, 
The Police Role and Higher Education, 7 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 467 (1979) (approving crimi-
nal justice programs in colleges and universities) and Roy R. Roberg, An Analysis of the Rela-
tionships Among Higher Education, Belief Systems, and Job Performance of Patrol Officers, 6 J. 
POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 336 (1978) (arguing that higher education fosters less dogmatic belief 
systems, which improves job performance) with Lotte E. Feinberg & Arthur S. Pfeffer, ''NE-
OTWY'' Meets Plain English: A Case Study of Writing in the NYPD, 10 J. POLICE Sci. & Ao-
MIN. 101 (1982) (arguing that liberal arts writing styles are not suited to police needs) and Jon 
Miller & Lincoln Fry, Reexamining Assumptions About Education and Professionalism in Law 
Enforcement, 4 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 187 (1976) (questioning whether education can in-
crease police professionalism). In the context of the Davis hypothetical, Test 21 might be viewed 
as a proxy for educational attainment. 
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intricate procedures. He must understand a myriad of regulations, stat-
utes and judicial rulings, and he will be called upon to apply them in his 
daily work. He must be able to present relevant facts in literate, clear 
and precise reports. When he testifies in court he must be articulate. He 
cannot achieve these goals unless he has a basic understanding of the 
English language and the meaning of words and the ability to perceive 
the import of written sentences.174 
In short, police officers must be able to comprehend and to speak 
White English because it is the language of law and the courtroom. 
Whether language standardization constitutes an "important" gov-
ernment purpose in this context is a close question.175 Arguably, lan-
guage standardization in the police force (and in the courts, and 
government generally) implicates more than mere "administrative 
convenience." My own sense is that a reviewing court would deem it 
"important"; if so, it would survive judicial scrutiny under the pro-
posed rule. At issue is the ability of the white majority to govern itself 
in its own language, and, if there is going to be a limit to cultural 
pluralism anywhere, it will most likely be located.at or near the seat of 
government. Put somewhat more positively, the majority white gov-
ernment is entitled to require that the officers it engages to enforce the 
law are able to comprehend its commands.176 
In whatever manner government's purpose is finally construed, 
challengers may then formulate and propose alternative means of 
achieving government's goals that they believe will not disadvantage 
black applicants. If, for example, communication with the (racially 
mixed) public was the sought-after skill, challengers might come up 
with a "Test 22" that would measure language skills appropriate to 
one or more nonwhite segments of the community. They might then 
propose that all applicants be required to achieve a minimum com-
bined score on Test 21 and "Test 22," or to receive some minimum 
score on either Test.111 
174. Davis, 512 F.2d at 966 (Robb, J., dissenting). 
175. I imagine it is difficult in large part because of our unfamiliarity with this degree of 
candor concerning the whiteness of government's aims. 
176. I remain troubled by this conclusion, though I think assimilationism in government is 
probably inevitable. Maybe that's what is troubling. Fran Ansley has commented to me that, at 
the same time, government has a duty to articulate its commands in ways that are comprehensi-
ble to its citizens. 
177. For an example of the possible use of a single combined test, see supra note 165. In this 
example, there is likely to be considerable resistance to the suggestion that an applicant could 
satisfy the language skills requirement solely by demonstrating a proficiency in some dialect 
other than "standard" English, and the resistance would surely intensify with any suggestion 
that the alternative criterion at issue might be some foreign language, such as Spanish. In other 
words, whites would be unlikely to accept a proposal that would certify as qualified candidates 
who were in fact monolingual in some "nonstandard" dialect of English, such as Black English, 
or in a language such as Spanish or French. Challengers might be well advised, therefore, to 
propose a substitute for Test 21 that measured a more colloquial version of "standard" English, 
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Envisioning pluralist means of implementing a government goal 
that has been given a monocultural interpretation is more difficult. 
Perhaps the ingenious challenger could identify some sort of language 
acquisition test that would select applicants who could be expected to 
have a relatively easy time acquiring the required skill in "standard" 
English; but perhaps no such test is available. If none is, heightened 
scrutiny would have functioned to identify an area of government 
decisionmaking in which assimilationism is permissible. The increase 
in candor associated with acknowledging the whiteness of formerly 
transparent white norms would in itself constitute an advance in race 
relations. 
If challengers propose alternative selection criteria, government 
must demonstrate that adoption of the proposed alternative to the sole 
use of Test 21 would impede its search for officers with "upgraded 
communicative abilities," as construed at the stage of purpose analy-
sis. If it cannot sustain that burden, government must adopt challeng-
ers' recommendations. Continued use of Test 21 alone would, under 
those circumstances, constitute an unjustifiable refusal to take trans-
parency seriously. 
The deeper design of the proposed rule is to foster constructive 
dialogue concerning the necessity and appropriateness of assimilation-
ist governmental purposes and means. The transparency phenomenon 
means that blacks evaluated under "facially neutral" norms in fact 
often face a choice between assimilation and exclusion. The proposed 
rule is intended to counteract the assimilationist force of transparency 
and to require government to confront the possibility of greater open-
ness to cultural diversity in the formulation of public policy and the 
exercise of governmental power. At the same time, the constitutional 
challenger becomes responsible for proposing alternative means of 
achieving government's articulated goals. 178 This requirement oper-
ates to relieve a white-controlled government of some of the burden of 
diversification; it does not require whites suddenly to be able to envi-
sion remedies for a phenomenon that has too often escaped our aware-
ness altogether. 179 Nonwhites who challenge transparently white-
in addition to criteria of decision that would test language proficiency more pluralistically de-
fined. 
The white reader who finds it improbable that a black person could be monolingual in Black 
English is directed to Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary Sch. Children v. Ann Arbor Sch. Dist. 
_ Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979), in which the court sustained plaintiffs' claim for 
instructional accommodation of black children who spoke Black English at home. 
178. In this proposal, government need not defend its chosen means vis·a-vis any less bur-
densome approach, but must do so only in regard to challengers' proffered alternatives. 
179. There is a danger here of permitting white decisionmakers to evade responsibility for 
transparency, because the burden is on challengers to propose alternatives to facially neutral but 
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specific governmental criteria of decision must take an active role in 
reformulating them.1so 
B. The Colorblindness Objection 
The proposed rule clearly abandons the colorblindness principle, 
which disapproves any use of any race-specific criterion of decision, no 
matter what the race of the decisionmaker or of the persons respec-
tively advantaged or burdened by that criterion.181 First, the proposed 
rule is founded on the presumption that facially neutral criteria of de-
cision employed by white decisionmakers are in fact race-specific; the 
rule at least challenges the assumption of the colorblindness perspec-
tive that such a thing as a racially neutral criterion of decision is possi-
ble. Second, the rule permits government to take responsibility for 
disparate racial effects by adopting parallel race-conscious criteria of 
decision in appropriate instances.182 Finally, though the proposed rule 
does resemble colorblindness insofar as it mandates heightened scru-
tiny in the interest of mitigating the race-based effects of some covertly 
race-specific criteria of decision, it does so only when those effects flow 
from transparently white-specific bases of decision. That is, the rule 
contemplates heightened judicial scrutiny only when facially neutral 
criteria formulated or deployed by white governmental decisionmakers 
operate to disadvantage nonwhites. It is not symmetrical; heightened 
scrutiny is not appropriate when black governmental decisionmakers 
white-specific criteria of decision. White people should not always rely on blacks to explain 
racism to us. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The 
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE 
L.J. 397, 401-08 (discussing problem of whites who want people of color to teach them about 
racism). Nevertheless, I adopt this reformist proposal primarily for the reason stated in the text: 
in order to moderate the immediate impact of the rule on whites. 
180. The proposed rule also means to effect a modest transfer of power to nonwhites. When 
they, but not white people, recognize another way of doing things, the proposed rule requires 
that government implement the alternatives nonwhite challengers submit. In addition, the threat 
of litigation presumably would provide government decisionmakers an incentive to involve 
blacks in decisionmaking processes, in a meaningful way, whenever possible. On the value of 
nonwhite perspectives, see Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 91 YALE LJ. 
420 (1988); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Differences: White 
Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095 (1992); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a 
Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39i Matsuda, 
Looking to the Bottom, supra note 15. 
181. This discussion addresses colorblindness as a constitutional "mediating principle," as 
described by Fiss, supra note 40, at 107-08. Thus, I do not distinguish between a rule that 
regards racial classifications as presumptively invalid and one that holds them invalid per se. 
182. This rule does not contemplate adoption of race-specific criteria of decision in response 
to transparency. However, in some cases challengers clearly will choose and propose alternatives 
because of their positive impact on nonwhites. See, for example, "Test 22," discussed supra text 
accompanying note 177. 
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formulate and apply facially neutral criteria that negatively impact 
whites. 
A transparency-conscious disparate impact rule should not be 
symmetrical because transparency itself is a white-specific phenome-
non. In our society only whites have the social power that renders our 
point of view perspectiveless, that elevates our expectations to the sta-
tus of "neutral" norms, and that permits us to see ourselves and our 
race-specific characteristics as raceless. Assuming there are, or can be, 
meaningful instances in which nonwhites gain the power to formulate 
as well as to apply governmental rules of decision, the existence of any 
disparate negative effect on whites would trigger at minimum an im-
mediate inquiry, by whites, into the possible racial components of such 
facially neutral rules. Nonwhite decisionmaking never benefits from 
transparency. 
Nevertheless, colorblindness is such a powerful norm that many 
will see its abandonment as a serious defect of the proposed rule. Fur-
ther reflection will demonstrate, however, that colorblindness is a 
highly problematic constitutional principle. Justice Scalia, the strict-
est adherent to the colorblindness principle currently on the Supreme 
Court, 183 staked out his position in the words of Alexander Bickel: 
" 'The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the les-
son of contemporary history have been the same for at least a genera-
tion: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, 
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic so-
ciety.' " 184 The remainder of this Part will consider, in turn, the 
claims that colorblindness is an established constitutional principle, 
that it is morally self-evident, and that it is instrumental to the attain-
ment of racial justice. 
The available evidence suggests that its framers did not understand 
the Fourteenth Amendment to constitutionalize an abstract color-
blindness principle. First, the series of race-conscious Freemen's Bu-
reau Acts adopted in the same period as the Fourteenth Amendment 
183. At this writing, no occasion has yet arisen for Justice Souter or Justice Thomas, as 
members of the Supreme Court, to delineate their precise views on the colorblindness principle. 
However, one can gain a sense of Justice Thomas' position from Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 
382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (opinion by Thomas, J.) (holding that preference for women owners in 
station permit process violates equal protection). Thomas' opinion failed to apply the degree of 
deference to congressional judgment arguably mandated by Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990). 
184. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT 133 (1975)). Bickel goes on to 
say: "Now this is to be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of fundamental 
principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial equality was demanded 
are to be more equal than others." BICKEL, supra. 
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supports the conclusion that the framers did not oppose race-con-
scious legislation per se.185 However, the argument that those meas-
ures were directed at aiding the actual victims of prior discrimination 
dilutes their evidentiary value. 186 The stronger case against the color-
blindness interpretation rests, ironically, on the work of Alexander 
Bickel, who reached the conclusion that the framers did not intend to 
outlaw segregated public education, antimiscegenation laws, or the ex-
clusion of blacks from jury service and the vote. 187 Bickel concluded 
that the framers left open the question of giving "greater protection" 
than the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which for him would have meant 
extending the prohibition against race-conscious measures, "to be de-
. cided another day."188 The colorblindness principle has become en-
trenched in doctrine, but rather gradually. As a matter of 
constitutional precedent, it is quite the new arrival on the block.189 
Contemporary commentators saw no unequivocal commitment to 
colorblindness in Brown v. Board of Education, 190 though some argued 
that the series of per curiam decisions that followed it compelled the 
185. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753 (1985). 
186. Laurence H. Tribe, "In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law be Co/or-blind?'~ 
20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201, 204 n.19 (1986) (attributing this point to the Brief of the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14-15, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 
U.S. 267 (1986)). The argument set forth in this paragraph generally follows that made by Tribe, 
supra. 
187. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 
HARV. L. REv. 1, 58 (1955). An earlier work by Frank and Munro reached a similar conclusion 
but stated the point less conclusively. See John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original 
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50 COLUM. L. REv. 131, 167-68 (1950) (ex-
pressing reservations about the conclusion that the framers intended to prohibit segregated 
schools and describing evidence on question of miscegenation as unclear). Several prominent 
scholars who, like Bickel, are strong proponents of the colorblindness principle also concede that 
it cannot be located in the framers' intent. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1971); Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis 
Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. Cr. REV. 
1, 21-22; William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage.· Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 776 (1979). 
188. Bickel, supra note 187, at 63. 
189. Of course, Justice Harlan articulated a colorblindness principle in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537 (1896), but he stated the proposition in dissent. See 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
190. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The leading exponents of the view that Brown did not enact color-
blindness were PAUL G. KAUPER, FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 217-19 (1956) 
("This decision admitted of a variety of interpretations."), Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness 
of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (prohibition of segregation supporta-
ble on ground that it disadvantaged black children), and Wechsler, supra note 65, at 32 ("The 
Court did not declare •.. that the fourteenth amendment forbids all racial lines in legislation 
•••• "). But see, e.g., ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE c. FERGUSON, JR., DESEGREGATION 
AND THE LAW: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES 145 (1957) 
(concluding that the Court had "declared that all classification by race is unconstitutional per 
se"). 
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conclusion that Brown rested on colorblindness after all. 191 However, 
subsequent desegregation decisions cut the other way; they tended to 
rely on racial balancing as a proxy for desegregation and on occasion 
suggested that race-conscious measures might be permissible outside 
the remedial context.192 Though the Court did adopt one rule embod-
ying the colorblindness perspective in 1976 - the requirement of dis-
criminatory intent193 - it declined to do the same in the more 
controversial context of race-specific affirmative action when opportu-
nities arose in 1974194 and 1978.195 The Court did not settle on an 
explicit doctrine requiring strict scrutiny of all race-specific measures 
until 1989.196 
191. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, ajfg. per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) 
(three-judge court) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), vacating per curiam 
223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955), overruled by McDermott Intl. Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991) 
(municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, ajfg. per curiam 220 F.2d 
386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches and bathhouses). 
The argument that the per curiam decisions compel the inference that Brown rested on color-
blindness is set forth in some detail in Andreas Auer, Public School Desegregation and the Color· 
Blind Constitution, 27 Sw. L.J. 454, 458-59 (1973). See also KAUPER, supra note 190, at 218-19; 
Van Alstyne, supra note 187, at 783; Wechsler, supra note 65, at 32. 
192. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); Auer, 
supra note 191, at 468-77 (stating that Court failed to clarify extent of government responsibility 
for de facto segregation); Freeman, supra note 5, at 1099-102 (describing "era of contradiction," 
in which the Court retained formal adherence to the "perpetrator'' perspective while achieving 
results more consistent with the "victim" perspective); Torres, supra note 15, at 1057-58 (arguing 
that Swann and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), suggested expansion of a 
result-oriented approach beyond the realm of Title VII). 
193. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For a discussion of the relation between 
the intent requirement and colorblindness, see supra note 24. 
In Alan Freeman's analysis, Davis marks the end of what he calls the era of rationalization, in 
which the implications of earlier "victim" perspective cases were limited and contained. Free-
man, supra note 131, at 134. My interpretation of the cases is consistent with his on this point, 
but I emphasize the Court's apparent unwillingness to articulate an unambiguous "perpetrator" 
perspective principle at that time. 
Another perspective on the significance, for the Court, of the difference between facially neu-
tral classifications with disparate effects and racially explicit classifications is presented by David 
Chang, who argues that the two types of legislation ought to be indistinguishable for a true 
judicial conservative. David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent 
Victims: Judicial Conservativism or Conservative Justices?, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 790 (1991). 
194. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (dismissed as moot). 
195. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (no majority on constitu-
tional standard). Even absent a majority opinion, Bakke was the landmark case on affirmative 
action for several years. The Court was at least equally badly divided in five other cases that 
preceded and followed Bakke. See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (frag-
mented 7-1 decision); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (6-3 decision; two three-mem-
ber pluralities); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (5-4 decision; only four 
Justices specifying level of review); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Assn. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 
421 (1986) (on constitutional issue, five Justices finding no violation, four without specifying level 
of review; remaining Justices not reaching constitutional question); United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149 (1987) (5-4 decision; no specification of standard of review). 
196. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Michael Klarman 
identifies McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), 
as the cases in which the Court first adopted a presumption against the use of racial classifica-
tions. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modem Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. 
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The evolution of the role of colorblindness in equal protection dis-
course is enlightening. Colorblindness was not in itself especially con-
troversial in the early post-Brown era. Its significance lay in its 
potential to resolve the process-theoretical difficulties Wechsler had 
understood Brown to pose.197 As one might expect, the colorblindness 
principle became an item of contention in its own right as the debate 
over affirmative action heated up. However, it shed its ties to process 
theory at the same time, largely because process theory, as refined by 
John Ely, found another approach to, and resolution of, the question 
of affirmative action: strict scrutiny is not appropriate when the white 
majority decides to favor nonwhites at its own expense.198 Increas-
ingly, colorblindness was defended in moral and substantive terms, 
featuring, for example, instrumental arguments that race-conscious 
measures would ultimately exacerbate racial tensions or that they in-
evitably stigmatize blacks.199 This shift in theoretical perspective, 
REv. 213, 254-57 (1991). However, these cases can be explained on the same rationale Klarman 
gives for not reading Brown to adopt a racial classification rule: they represent the elevation of 
interracial marriage "to the level of other fundamental rights with regard to which the Equal 
Protection Clause forbade racial discrimination." Id. at 247. The strict presumption against all 
racial classifications, stated in universal terms, did not command a majority of the Court until 
Richmond. 
197. For a description of the process difficulties of Brown, see Peller, supra note 65; Wechs-
ler, supra note 65, at 31-34. Commentators who understood colorblindness as a neutral solution 
to Wechsler's puzzle include Bork, supra note 187, at 14-15, and Louis H. Pollak, Racial Dis-
crimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
The collegial tone of the discussion is exemplified by Charles Black's comment that Pollak's 
colorblindness interpretation, which was markedly distinct from Black's own approach, seemed 
to him "a sound alternative ground for the desegregation holdings." Black, supra note 190, at 
421 n.2. 
198. John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 
723, 727 (1974). Michael Klarman describes this as the "disaggregation" of political process 
theory and the colorblindness principle. See Klarman, supra note 196, at 310-11. The diver-
gence may be explained as a consequence of the evolution of process theory; the emphasis of 
political process theory on legislative competence removed the need to cling to models of judicial 
competence such as the colorblindness principle. See supra note 65. I am intrigued, however, by 
the fact that colorblindness, not political process theory, captured the mainstream position on 
affirmative action. One explanation is offered by Peller, supra note 5, at 835-44: colorblindness 
gained currency in reaction to the threat posed by black nationalism. 
199. Opponents of affirmative action who rely, at least in part, on instrumental rationales 
include Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. 
REv. 1312, 1321-22 (1986) (arguing that affirmative action leads to political struggle and stigma-
tizes beneficiaries); Posner, supra note 187, at 12 (arguing that affirmative action encourages 
bigotry); William B. Reynolds, Individualism v. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE 
L.J. 995, 1002-03 (1984) (arguing that mandatory busing harms public education); Antonin 
Scalia, The Disease as Cure: ''In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of 
Race," 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 149. (1979) (arguing that affirmative action will require hiring less 
qualified persons); Van Alstyne, supra note 187, at 808 (argtiing that affirmative action exacer-
bates racial tensions). 
Instrumental arguments fit more comfortably with distributional conceptions of equality, 
which provide one basis for advocacy of affirmative action. Representative approaches include 
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 
CAL. L. REv. 3 (1979); Fiss, supra note 40; Freeman, supra note 3; Randall Kennedy, Persuasion 
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from the "neutral" to the avowedly substantive, coincided, of course, 
with the conceptualization of the "innocent" white "victim" of affirm-
ative action.200 One has to rephrase Bickel's famous remark: Whose 
ox was being gored at the time when colorblindness took center stage 
in the equality debate?201 
Turning from the legal to the moral realm, the principal founda-
tion of colorblindness seems to be its enormous intuitive appeal. To 
"judge a person by the color of his skin" just seems wrong. 202 This 
moral insight may be the visceral rejection of its equally visceral oppo-
site, the tendency of human beings to react negatively to persons of a 
different color than themselves.203 However, moral insights are at best 
problematic sources of constitutional doctrine204 and must in any 
event be subject to revision in the light of experience. 
The colorblindness principle may also appear morally desirable by 
and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1986); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. 
L. REv. 78 (1986). 
200. See Ansley, supra note 14, at 1005-23 (describing change in tone of discourse and ana-
lyzing the concept of the "innocent" white affirmative action "victim"); Thomas Ross, Innocence 
and Affirmative Action, 43 V AND. L. REV. 297 (1990) (exploring the connection between the 
rhetoric of innocence and racism). 
201. Bickel's comment is reproduced supra note 184. Donald Lively contends that the argu-
ments against affirmative action are consistent with a pattern of interpreting the Equal Protection 
Clause in ways that serve majority interests. Lively, supra note 14. 
202. "I have a dream that my four little children one day will live in a nation where they will 
not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character." CORETIA Scorr 
KING, MY LIFE WITH MARTIN LUTIIER KING, JR. 239 (1969) (quoting Martin Luther King, 
Jr., Aug. 28, 1963). Of course, Dr. King's understanding of racism was multifaceted. See Peller, 
supra note 5, at 813-16. 
203. Accordingly, the colorblindness principle frequently is treated in legal discourse as self-
evident, as in Justice Scalia's Richmond opinion. Only one of the four authorities he cites makes 
any attempt at supporting the colorblindness principle. The authorities and full quotations are as 
follows: BICKEL, quoted supra text accompanying note 184; "Our Constitution is color-blind 
••.. " Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
And now that it has become a settled rule of constitutional law that color or race is no badge 
of inferiority and no test of capacity to participate in the government, we doubt if any dis-
tinction whatever, either in right or in privilege, which has color or race for its sole basis, 
can either be established in the law or enforced where it had been previously established. 
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION § 1961, 677 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 
1873); "[T]he same securities which one citizen may demand, all others are now entitled to." 
THOMAS M. COOLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 439 (2d ed. 1871). 
Justice Kennedy's analysis is similar: "The moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driv-
ing force of the Equal Protection Clause." Richmond, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
204. Laurence Tribe remarks on the inconsistencies implicit in conservatives' adherence to 
strict colorblindness: they generally attempt to respect the intent of the Constitution's Framers, 
they regard judicial alteration of constitutional norms as impermissible, they advocate deference 
to political majorities when a constitutional provision is unclear, and they are reluctant to have 
courts fashion new rights. Tribe, supra note 186, at 206-07; see also Chang, supra note 193, at 
800-09 (contending that distinction between disparate impact cases and affirmative action cases is 
inconsistent with judicial conservativism); Klarman, supra note 196, at 314-16 (arguing that the 
colorblindness approach is difficult to square with the judicial philosophy otherwise espoused by 
Justices who oppose affirmative action). 
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virtue of its relation to the liberal value of individual autonomy. Col-
orblindness often is seen as an expression of individual autonomy, 
which requires in part that persons not be held responsible or judged 
for personal characteristics not within their own control.205 Individu-
als ought to reap the fruits of their own industry, but they ought 
neither to benefit nor to be disadvantaged because of characteristics 
like race or gender that are a matter of birth.206 
However, colorblindness is at best a paradoxical means of imple-
menting autonomy values. On the one hand, autonomy is not served 
when the individual is pigeonholed by race; certainly the whole person 
is much more than the color of her skin.207 On the other hand, indi-
vidual autonomy ought to include the power of self-definition, the abil-
ity to make fundamental value choices and to select life strategies to 
implement them.208 Such choices are not unbounded; for many indi-
205. Under our Constitution, the government may never act to the detriment of a person 
solely because of that person's race. The color of a person's skin and the country of his 
origin are immutable facts that bear no relation to ability, disadvantage, moral culpability, 
or any other characteristics of constitutionally permissible interest to government. 
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see 
also Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 1063 (In the colorblind perspective, "[t]o categorize on the basis 
of race is to miss the individual."); R. Kennedy, supra note 3, at 1816 ("[R]acial generalizations 
••• derogate from the individuality of persons insofar as their unique characteristics are sub-
merged in the image of the group to which they are deemed to belong."). 
206. See supra note 3. Gary Peller describes the liberal rejection of race as a relevant per-
sonal characteristic as a function of rationalism: taking race into account reflects the irrational-
ism of prejudice or bias rather than the accurate perception of the person as an individual, 
independent of racial group identification. Peller, supra note 5, at 768-69. However, his analysis 
seems to me to lead to the conclusion that the rejection of an individual racial identity is analyti-
cally prior to the notion of rationalism: to take race into account is a matter of prejudice only if 
one already has decided that race is irrelevant to personal identity. 
The question whether race is a matter of "individual" or "group" identity bears on doctrinal 
debates in another way as well. At least since the publication of Owen Fiss' article titled Groups 
and the Equal Protection Clause, cited supra note 40, the concept of group identity or group 
rights has been associated with an antisubordination interpretation of equal protection, and the 
notion of individual rights has come to serve as a proxy for the colorblindness interpretation. 
See, for example, the plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor in Richmond: "[T]he rights created 
by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. 
The rights established are personal rights." 488 U.S. at 493 (quoting Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 
1, 22 (1948)); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discussed supra text accompa-
nying notes 40-41); Reynolds, supra note 199, at 996. 
There is indeed a necessary connection between the concept of subordination and groups: 
one cannot be subordinated, in the structural sense, as an individual. The individual's 
subordinate (or dominant) status is a product of the group(s) of which she is a member. How-
ever, this simple reality does not dictate that antisubordination analyses must adopt the concept 
of "group rights." Furthermore, the equation of colorblindness with the notion of individual 
rights is simply fallacious. As the discussion in the text should make clear, there is every reason 
to regard race as a central component of individual identity. See also sources cited infra note 
208. 
207. Note that this view incorporates only the notion of race as skin color; it does not recog-
nize the status, historical, or cultural dimensions of race. For an examination of all four facets of 
race, see Gotanda, supra note 1, at 36-40, 56-59. 
208. See Matsuda, Accent Discrimination, supra note 15, at 1389-92 (arguing that fostering 
individual autonomy requires acceptance of accent pluralism); see also D. Kennedy, supra note 3, 
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viduals, to be oneself is to share in the cultural values of a community 
to which one belongs by birth.209 Thus, for example, for many black 
people embracing blackness as an ·explicit and positive aspect of per-
sonal identity is an essential component in the process of self-
definition. 210 
Again, the Washington v. Davis facts are illustrative. Some black 
applicants almost certainly had grown up and continued to live in 
black neighborhoods in which Black English was the primary spoken 
dialect, and it was equally likely that some of those would prefer to use 
that dialect on the job as well. Test 21, however, measured proficiency 
in "standard" (White) English211 and likely signaled the intent of the 
police department to require the use of White English in the work-
place. Even the Black English speakers who passed Test 21 must have 
experienced some loss, or displacement, of self on the job; the unsuc-
cessful test takers essentially were told that they could not occupy the 
powerful post of police officer if they remained monolingual in Black 
English.212 
Proponents of the existing disparate impact rule appear to believe 
that individual autonomy is served when decisionmakers "ignore" the 
race of those affected by their decisions,213 but the transparency phe-
at 722-26, 745-48 (arguing that individuality is not separable from culture); Peller, supra note 5, 
at 794 (stating that the nationalist i)erspective does not see group identity as opposed to individ-
ual freedom); Torres & Milun, supra note 15, at 658 (arguing that, if failure to respect cultural 
grouping limits individual self-determination, result is indefensible on liberal grounds). 
209. Of course, the question of self-definition through community membership is mul-
tidimensional; two examples will illustrate the point. First, there is the perspective of many 
lesbians and gay men, who see themselves as having the sexual orientation they do as a matter of 
choice rather than birth. I imagine that the liberal who agrees with the principle that (some) 
immutable characteristics are irrelevant to personal identity would want to exclude this form of 
lesbian and gay self-identity from the category of irrelevance. Perhaps for that reason, civil 
rights claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation often cast homosexuality as 
matter of birth, not choice. See Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Pro-
tection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989). 
Second, there is the matter of the degree to which a community's norms are constrained by its 
oppression; self-defining choices become a most complex phenomenon when resistance to subor-
dination is an essential component of community life. See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound/, 1989 
WIS. L. REV. 539. 
210. See Janet E. Helms, An Overview of Black Racial Identity Theory, in BLACK AND 
WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY, supra note 20, at 9. 
211. Some examples of the questions included in Test 21 are reproduced supra note 31. 
212. White outsiders too conceivably could experience some loss of autonomy if required to 
assimilate to "standard" English. In general, this observation only reinforces the point that as-
similationism negatively impacts individual autonomy. However, I would offer a more specific 
contention as well: for black people, the autonomy costs of assimilationist policies are often race-
related. 
213. Neil Gotanda describes this as the rule of nonrecognition: race is first noticed, then 
suppressed, so that it is "not considered" in a decisionmaking process. Gotanda argues that the 
technique of nonrecognition helps maintain the subordination of nonwhites. See Gotanda, supra 
note 1, at 16-23. In a sense, the Feeney rule, which requires that a facially neutral practice have 
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nomenon, which suggests that colorblindness may operate instead as 
an opening for the unthinking imposition of white norms and expecta-
tions, belies that view. The proposed rule takes a broader view of per-
sonal autonomy and takes seriously the centrality of race to many 
individuals' self-definition.214 For those who have to choose between 
the language, customs, hairstyle, dress, or lifestyle of their own com-
munity and a desirable job or other governmental benefit, the auton-
omy costs of transparently white norms are considerable.215 
The final category of arguments purporting to support the color-
blindness principle may be characterized, loosely, as exemplifying an-
tisubordinationist concerns. Race consciousness - the explicit use of 
racial classifications as a means of disadvantaging nonwhites - has 
been the primary vehicle of racial subordination until quite recently.216 
The ideology of opposition to racial hierarchy evolved in reaction to 
the specific forms in which racial oppression had manifested itself. 
Rejecting racial distinctions seemed the natural avenue to reversing 
that history of oppression and achieving racial justice, especially dur-
ing the "Second Reconstruction" of the 1950s and 1960s; colorblind-
ness appeared to be the exact antithesis of the form of race 
consciousnes~ that had been the root .cause of racial subordination.217 
If "color" had marked an individual as inferior, then the refusal to 
recognize "color" would be the way to elevate him to equal status with 
whites. In effect, colorblindness became the rule-like proxy for an un-
derlying, historically based antisubordination principle.21s 
The problem with the colorblindness principle as a strategy for 
been adopted "because of, not merely in spite of," its racially disparate effects, is a doctrinal 
codification of the rule of nonrecognition. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278-79. 
214. The belief that race is not central to individual identity may be just one more facet of the 
transparency phenomenon. Whites do not have to self-identify as white, because social institu-
tions assume whiteness. See supra text accompanying notes 75-86. 
215. Of course, individual autonomy is not an absolute value; it may be constrained when the 
constraint is substantially related to the accomplishment of important governmental purposes. 
See supra text accompanying notes 175-76. 
216. See GILBERT T. STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 348 (1910) 
(nearly every state and-territory had some race-specific classifications). For a description of the 
pre-Civil War attitudes of white Americans toward blacks, see WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE 
OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 (1968). 
217. Peller, supra note 5, at 836. 
218. What is this but declaring .•. that no discrimination shall be made against [blacks] 
because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they 
contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the 
colored race, - the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively 
as colored, - exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, 
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discrimina-
tions which are steps toward reducing them to the condition of a subject race. , 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 5, at 1076; 
Freeman, supra note 3, at 321; R. Kennedy, supra note 199, at 1335-36. 
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achieving racial justice is that it has not been effective outside the so-
cial context in which it arose. Like all rules, colorblindness is both 
over- and underinclusive with respect to the underlying policy - an-
tisubordination - it is intended to implement.219 It is underinclusive 
because the explicit use of racial classifications is no longer the princi-
pal vehicle of racial oppression; structural and institutional racism, of 
the sort illustrated by the transparency phenomenon, now are the pre-
dominant causes of blacks' continued inability to thrive in this soci-
ety. 220 Colorblindness is overinclusive insofar as it regards the explicit 
use of racial classifications to advantage blacks as equally blamewor-
thy as the historical use of such classifications to blacks' disadvan-
tage. 221 In each respect colorblindness fails to implement racial 
justice; that it is a failed social policy is evident from the statistics 
revealing that blacks are scarcely better off today than they were 
before this ideology took hold in the 1950s and 1960s.222 
Liberals who wish to implement the goal of racial justice should 
give up the colorblindness principle in favor of a functional analysis of 
proposed means of achieving those ends. The proposed rule offers a 
better prospect for achieving racial equity223 because it permits non-
whites to engage white-controlled government in a dialogue concern-
ing the scope of government's goals and the range of means that might 
be effective in attaining them. It requires government to define its 
goals in ways that do not systematically favor whites, and it also re-
quires government to utilize diverse means of achieving its goals when-
ever possible. Unlike the inflexible, acontextual, and ahistorical 
colorblindness principle, the proposed rule offers the opportunity for 
government to take responsibility for racial justice. 224 
219. Frederick Schauer has illustrated the problem of rules and underlying policies with the 
"no vehicles in the park" hypothetical, which traces its genealogy back to H.L.A. HART, THE 
CoNCEPT OF LAW (1961). Assume that one's purpose in excluding vehicles is to reduce noise 
and air pollution. For any definition of vehicle, a strict rule prohibiting any "vehicle" from 
entering the park is necessarily both over- and underinclusive with respect to the articulated 
purpose. It is overinclusive as applied to a stationary, nonworking truck placed in the park as a 
war monument or to an electric golf cart; it is underinclusive with respect to a gasoline-powered 
generator. Schauer argues that over- and underinclusiveness with respect to purposes is the inev-
itable price one pays for the predictability of rules. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 91 YALE L.J. 
509, 524-26, 540-41 (1988). Pat Williams' sausage machine hypothetical provides another per-
spective on concepts and purposes. WILLIAMS, supra note IS, at 107-10. 
220. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text. 
221. See the discussion of the affirmative action debate, supra notes 197-201 and accompany-
ing text. 
222. Some relevant facts are cited supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. The failure of 
colorblindness is also discussed in the sources cited supra note 14. 
223. This is not meant to suggest that the ultimate goal should be measured solely in distri-
butional terms. See infra note 232. 
224. The proposed rule reflects an antisubordinationist interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In this view, the guarantee of equal protection precludes government participation 
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C. An Institutional Objection 
The institutional objection to the proposed rule mirrors the final, 
and for many, most persuasive argument articulated in Washington v. 
Davis: 
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless 
invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or bur-
dens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise 
seriou!' questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, 
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be 
more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more 
affi.uent white.225 
In short, the proposed rule might require the courts to engage in a 
form of economic redistribution. 226 
Of course, the proposed rule would not cut so deeply into the eco-
nomic status quo as would the alternative rejected by the Davis Court: 
strict scrutiny of all rules with racially disparate effects. Because the 
proposed rule imposes a lower level of scrutiny on a finding of dispro-
portionate impact, government's burden of justification would be more 
easily sustained, and thus there would be fewer instances of judicial 
invalidation with which to be concemed.227 
Nevertheless, the proposed rule does have, and is intended to have, 
in the subordination of blacks by whites. The concept of subordination focuses not on intent, nor 
on an abstract rejection of racial classifications, but on racial hierarchy. It is concerned with 
issues like stigma, subordinate social status, and the systematic exclusion of blacks from access to 
intangible and material goods that are more freely available to whites. From the' antisubordina-
tion perspective, an unbroken line of descent connects the Black Codes to racial apartheid to the 
transparency phenomenon. Other analyses that adopt some form of antisubordination perspec-
tive include LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1514-21 (2d ed. 1988); 
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 
1003 (1986); Freeman, supra note 5 (the "victim" perspective). 
Robin West proposes an alternative interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, distinct 
from either colorblindness or the antisubordination principle, in Robin West, Toward An Aboli-
tionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 111 (1991). The "aboli-
tionist" approach emphasizes state protection of individuals against private violence and 
violation. Id. at 129-30. Thus, West argues, under this conception the state has an affirmative 
obligation to intervene in cases of marital rape and child abuse, for example, and, less plausibly, 
to provide a minimal level of subsistence. Id. at 140-42, 145-46. 
225. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). The Court adds to the list of facially 
innocent criteria that might be adversely affected "tests and qualifications for voting, draft defer-
ment, public employment, jury service, and other government-conferred benefits and opportuni-
ties ... ; [s]ales taxes, bail schedules, utility rates, bridge tolls, license fees, and other state-
imposed charges." 426 U.S. at 248 n.14 (quoting Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segrega-
tion: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. R.Ev. 275, 300 (1972)). 
226. The quoted passage also alludes to the "too much judicial review" objection, addressed 
supra note 140. 
227. The Washington v. Davis facts provide an example of an assimilationist purpose that 
would be upheld against the level of scrutiny applicable under the proposed rule. See supra notes 
175-76 and accompanying text. The purpose hypothesized there would probably not survive 
strict scrutiny, however. 
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some racially redistributive effects. The Davis argument points out a 
core dilemma in liberal egalitarian rhetoric: while we approve and are 
willing in some respects to foster racial equality, we endorse no similar 
economic egalitarianism.228 Thus, because our history of the overt 
and covert, intentional and thoughtless oppression of blacks by whites 
has placed the former in a relatively disadvantaged economic position, 
any attempt at racial reform runs afoul of our at least equally strong 
resistance to intervention in the existing distribution of economic 
goods, a resistance that is especially acute when the federal judiciary 
assumes responsibility to alter the status quo. 229 
The solution to the dilemma, I think, is for white people to ac-
knowledge that taking responsibility for race discrimination does and 
should cost something.230 Implementing "Test 22" will indeed mean 
that fewer white officers will be hired onto the D.C. police force; em-
ploying criteria of selection that place more blacks in policymaking 
positions may well mean that government expends funds differently 
than before and expends relatively less to benefit whites. If the status 
quo results from a long history of the systematic privileging of whites, 
as it surely does, then one can only expect that a more racially just 
society would see a different, and more equal, distribution of societal 
goods.231 
The proposed rule in fact has relatively modest redistributive ef-
fects. It does no more than require government not to pursue thought-
lessly goals that advantage whites, and it permits nonwhites to propose 
inclusive means of accomplishing permissible goals; it does not man-
228. In effect, the mainstream view seems to be that "equal stratification" would achieve 
racial equality. Alan D. Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 YALE 
L.J. 1880, 1895 (1981) (reviewing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 
(2d ed. 1980)). On the weaknesses of this vision, see Ansley, supra note 14, at 1048-50. 
229. Our cultural resistance to equitable wealth distribution is exacerbated for the judiciary 
by the "countermajoritarian difficulty," a legacy of process theory. See supra note 65. Judges are 
especially reluctant to engage in redistribution in the absence of a perceived cultural consensus 
mandating that course of action. However, judges often are prepared to intervene in the political 
process over the distribution of goods deemed "fundamental" because the label fundamental 
itself signals a significant degree of liberal consensus regarding that right. See Ortiz, supra note 
51, at 1140-42. In my view, ample cultural justification exists to regard racial equality as an 
equally fundamental "right." 
230. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Con· 
ditions, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5, 6 (1976) ("[W]hite self interest will prevail over black rights 
•... "); Lively, supra note 14, at 492 ("Redress of the legacy and reality of racial injustice thus 
becomes a function of what does not offend the majority ...• "). 
With respect to the desegregation cases, Mary Dudziak has provided historical documenta· 
tion to support Bell's descriptive thesis that whites adopt antiracist measures only when self· 
interest so directs. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 61 (1988). 
231. The Fourteenth Amendment certainly was intended to effect some degree of redistribu-
tion relative to the regime created by the Black Codes. The crucial question for white interpret-
ers is how much redistribution we are willing to tolerate. 
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date absolute distributional equality.232 It lays some of the burden of 
formulating more inclusive strategies at the feet of nonwhites, but it 
requires government to adopt those strategies whenever possible. To 
that extent, the proposed rule mandates a modest transfer of power as 
well as a somewhat more racially just distribution of benefits and bur-
dens. We whites should expect no less from any rule that attempts 
seriously to address the structural racism of which transparency is one 
manifestation. 
CONCLUSION 
White people can do better than to continue to impose our beliefs, 
values, norms, and expectations on black people under the rubric of 
race neutrality. Recognizing transparency for the defining characteris-
tic of whiteness that it is ought to impel us to a radical skepticism 
concerning the possibility of race-neutral decisionmaking. Operating 
from the presumption that facially neutral criteria of decision are in 
reality race-specific can prompt whites committed to the realization of 
racial justice to search for and adopt more racially inclusive ways of 
doing business. In this way, the skeptical stance can be instrumental 
in the development of a positive white racial identity, one that compre-
hends whiteness not as the (unspoken) racial norm, but as just one 
racial identity among many. 
Whites who wish to see the destruction of racial hierarchy can 
hold government to the same standards of transparency consciousness. 
We can and ought to expect the institution designed to be representa-
tive of all the people not to contribute to the maintenance of white 
supremacy. The demand that government decisionmakers take re-
sponsibility for race discrimination by adopting the skeptical stance 
can be embodied in the rejection of the discriminatory intent require-
ment. A reformed disparate impact rule would prefer pluralist 
interpretations of government purposes, and it would require imple-
mentation through pluralist means whenever possible. Uncovering, 
naming, and counteracting the unrecognized whiteness of a white-
dominated government and of the criteria of decision it employs is a 
first, crucial step in the realignment of social power that dismantling 
white supremacy entails. 
232. Under this proposal, distributional inequality is permissible whenever government is 
able to defend an assimilationist purpose or is able to show that proposed pluralist means of 
accomplishing a permissible purpose would be less effective than existing means. 
